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German Summary / Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es zu untersuchen, ob offene Innovationsprozesse Unternehmen positiv oder 
negativ beeinflussen. Der von Chesbrough (2003) geprägte Begriff “offene Innovation” (open 
innovation) konnte seither große Bedeutung in Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft gewinnen. 
Chesbrough vermutet, dass die Art und Weise, wie Unternehmen ihre Entwicklungen und 
Erfindungen vermarkten und weiterentwickeln, sich grundlegend verändert hat. Unternehmen 
haben sich von internen Forschungs- und Entwicklungs-Aktivitäten (F&E) abgewendet und 
offenen Innovationsprozessen zugewandt (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006). Der Ansatz offener 
Innovationsprozesse betrachtet Forschung und Entwicklung als ein offenes System, in welchem 
internen und externen Wissensquellen dieselbe Bedeutung beigemessen wird (Chesbrough et al., 
2006). Im Falle offener Innovationsprozesse sind betriebliche Strukturen durchlässig und 
Unternehmen suchen aktiv die Interaktion mit externen Akteuren (Chesbrough, 2003).  
 
Diese Veränderungen im Innovationsmanagement werden mit erhöhtem globalen Wettbewerb 
und schnellen Änderungen im Marktumfeld assoziiert (Chesbrough, 2003). Da heutzutage 
technologische Veränderungen sehr ressourcenintensiv sind und sich der Lebenszyklus vieler 
Produkte extrem verkürzt hat, müssen Unternehmen damit umgehen, nicht mehr alle F&E-
Aktivitäten intern bewältigen zu können (Chesbrough, 2003; Keupp und Gassmann, 2009). Aus 
diesem Grund erhöhen Unternehmen den Grad ihrer F&E-Offenheit und teilen dadurch Kosten 
und Risiken von F&E-Projekten mit externen Akteuren. Damit erhalten sie nicht nur Zugriff auf 
die nötigen Ressourcen, sondern beschleunigen auch den Innovationsprozess (Chesbrough, 2003; 
Keupp und Gassmann, 2009). 
 
Der wachsende Trend hin zu offenen Innovationsprozessen wird weiter durch aktuelle 
Entwicklungen in Informations- und Telekommunikationstechnologien erleichtert (Dodgson et 
al., 2006), welche es Unternehmen erlauben, sich untereinander zu vernetzten und mit hoch-
qualifizierten Wissenschaftlern und Ingenieuren aus aller Welt zu sehr geringen Kosten 
zusammenzuarbeiten. Da Wissen mit Hilfe moderner Informations- und 
Kommunikationstechnologien augenblicklich und kostengünstig mit vielen Menschen an vielen 
verschiedenen Orten geteilt werden kann, ist der Wert der rein internen F&E-Aktivitäten 
erheblich geschwunden (Malone und Laubacher, 1998; Chesbrough, 2003). Daher sind 




Die Literatur zum Thema offener Innovationen unterscheidet zwei allgemeine Strategien der 
externen Wissensbeschaffung durch formale Verträge: i) Outsourcing von F&E-Aufgaben und 
ii) gemeinsame Entwicklung von Innovationen. Die externen Akteure sind dann entweder F&E 
Anbieter oder Innovations-Kooperationspartner. Die erste Strategie impliziert die Akquise 
einen Entwicklungsergebnisses von externen Akteuren, während bei der zweiten Strategie die 
Kooperationspartner zusammen die Entwicklung wertvoller Wissensgüter anstreben. Um mit 
den schnellen Veränderungen im Marktumfeld umgehen zu können, müssen Unternehmen 
F&E-Aufgaben an spezialisierte Forschungsinstitutionen auslagern oder Innovationen 
gemeinsam mit diesen entwickeln. Diese Vorgehensweisen können Unternehmen dabei helfen, 
Innovationen relativ schnell und kostengünstig zu entwickeln und sich dadurch rasch auf neue 
Marktentwicklungen, Bedrohungen und Möglichkeiten einzustellen (Chesbrough, 2003; Keupp 
und Gassmann, 2009). Nichtsdestotrotz kann ein Wechsel von internen F&E Bemühungen zu 
offenen und dezentralisierten Innovationsprozessen auch Risiken beherbergen. Unternehmen 
können unter Umständen die Fähigkeit verlieren, intern Innovationen hervorzubringen und 
somit ihre eigene Innovationsleistung negativ beeinflussen. Diese Arbeit soll, motiviert von 
diesen gegensätzlichen Argumenten, Risiken und Chancen offener Innovationsprozesse näher 
analysieren.  
 
Bevor die Leistungsauswirkungen dieses Ansatzes näher untersucht werden, wird in Kapitel 2 
diskutiert, wie Unternehmen bei offenen Innovationsprozessen Grenzen setzen. Frühere 
Untersuchungen  offener Innovationsprozesse bieten keinen systematischen Einblick, ob 
Unternehmen mit internen Innovationsbeschränkungen mehr F&E Outsourcing betreiben oder die 
Anzahl ihrer Innovationskooperationen erhöhen. Infolgedessen beschäftigt sich Kapitel 2 mit 
dieser Forschungslücke und analysiert, ob es sich um kosten- oder ressourcenorientierte 
Determinanten handelt, welche Unternehmen dazu ermutigen, verschiedene Arten von offenen 
Innovationsstrategien zu verfolgen. Die Auswertung eines Paneldatensatzes deutscher 
Unternehmen des produzierenden Gewerbes, welcher aus dem Mannheimer Innovationspanel 
stammt, zeigt, dass wissensbezogene Hindernisse zu einer Erweiterung des F&E Outsourcings 
und zu mehr Innovationskooperationen mit einer Vielzahl an externen Akteuren führen. Im 
Gegensatz dazu, wird eine insignifikante Beziehung zwischen Innovationshindernissen 
ökonomischen Ursprungs und F&E-Offenheit festgestellt. Die Studie zeigt insbesondere, dass 
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Kosten- und Risikominimierung weder eine signifikante Rolle für den erhöhten Umfang an 
F&E Outsourcing noch für den Eingang von Innovationskooperationen spielt. Demzufolge 
kann gezeigt werden, dass die offene Innovationsübernahme ein wertsteigerndes Ziel verfolgt 
und nicht zur Kostenminimierung genutzt wird. Sprich, das Wachstumsziel (im Bezug auf 
externe Wissensbeschaffung) ist der Hauptfaktor, welcher Unternehmen dazu anregt, 
Outsourcing von F&E-Aktivitäten zu betreiben und Innovationskooperationen einzugehen, 
während das Ziel der Kosten- und Risikominimierung keine signifikante Rolle spielt. Aus 
diesem Grund sollten Unternehmen größeren Wert auf strategische Überlegungen legen, wenn 
sie den Grad der Offenheit ihrer Innovationsprozesse erhöhen; und sie sollten versuchen, 
Wachstum durch die Anwendung von offenen Innovationsstrategien zu erreichen. Es ist dennoch 
überraschend, dass der vorrangige Grund fürgroß angelegtes F&E Outsourcing darin liegt, mit 
wissensbezogenen Innovationsbeschränkungen zurecht zu kommen. F&E Outsourcing Strategien 
helfen Unternehmen möglicherweise dabei, relevantes und intern nicht verfügbares Wissen zu 
erlangen. Anderseits ist es jedoch möglich, dass der externe Zugriff auf Wissen durch entfernte 
vertragliche Beziehungen keine effektive Strategie darstellt, um implizites technologisches 
Wissen richtig zu nutzen. Des Weiteren kann diese Strategie eigene Innovationsaktivitäten des 
outsourcenden Unternehmens verdrängen und somit dazu führen, dass die Innovationsleistung 
des Unternehmens abnimmt. 
 
In Kapitel 3 wird dieses Problem erläutert und es wird untersucht, ob F&E Outsourcing1, oder 
externe F&E, andere Innovationsstrategien komplementiert oder substituiert (z.B. interne F&E 
und Innovationskooperationen). Obwohl frühere Untersuchungen dieses Problem diskutieren 
(Cassiman und Veugelers, 2006; Schmiedeberg, 2008; Lokshin et al., 2008; Grimpe und Kaiser, 
2010), wurde die geographische Dimension externer F&E bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch nicht 
näher untersucht. Anders ausgedrückt, Unternehmen, welche internationales F&E Outsourcing 
betreiben, tendieren eher dazu, in interne F&E Projekte zu investieren und 
Innovationskooperationen einzugehen als Unternehmen die nationales F&E Outsourcing 
betreiben. Ein möglicher Grund dafür ist, dass die Nutzung extern erlangten Wissens aus 
internationalen Quellen eines höheren internen Leistungsvermögens bedarf (von Zedtwitz und 
                                                          




Gassmann, 2002; Bertrand und Mol, 2013). Daher werden weitere Untersuchungen benötigt, um 
festzustellen, ob nationales und internationales F&E Outsourcing interne F&E Aktivitäten und 
Innovationskooperationen komplementiert oder substituiert. Im Laufe dieses Kapitels wird 
weiterhin untersucht, welche Leistungsimplikationen nationale und internationale externe 
F&E haben. Dieser Sachverhalt wird mit Hilfe eines Querschnittsdatensatzes dänischer 
Unternehmen des produzierenden Gewerbes analysiert, welcher dem Community Innovation 
Survey entnommen wurde. Diese Umfrage enthält Informationen zu Ausgaben für F&E, 
welche durch nationale oder internationale externe Akteure durchgeführt wurden und 
daraufhin in internen Innovationsaktivitäten genutzt wurden. Um die Existenz einer 
komplementäre Beziehung zwischen den Innovationsstrategien zu überprüfen, wurden der 
anwendungsorientierte - (adoption approach)  und der leistungsorientierte Ansatz 
(performance approach) genutzt. Der anwendungsorientierte Ansatz zeigt, dass internationale 
externe F&E interne F&E und Innovationskooperationen komplementiert. Im Gegensatz dazu finden 
sich bei Verwendung des leistungsorientierten Ansatzes ein signifikant negativer Effekt der 
gemeinsamen Nutzung dieser Strategien auf Produktinnovationen. Dieser Gegensatz zeigt die 
Schwierigkeiten auf, welche beim Versuch einer erfolgreichen Verbindung von internationaler 
externer F&E mit interner F&E sowie bei der Verbindung von internationaler externer F&E mit 
Innovationskooperationen auftreten. Dies hängt möglicherweise damit zusammen, dass ein hoher 
Grad an Innovationsoffenheit das Problem absorptiver Kapazitäten (absorptive capacity problem) 
verursachen könnte. Aus diesem Grund müssen Unternehmen ihre internen F&E Aktivitäten und 
den Grad an Innovationsoffenheit ins Gleichgewicht bringen, um das Oversearching Problem zu 
vermeiden und vom offenen Innovationsmodell zu profitieren. Des Weiteren kann keine 
signifikant komplementäre oder substituierende Beziehung zwischen einheimischem externen 
F&E und internen F&E, sowie zwischen einheimischem externen F&E und 
Innovationskooperationen festgestellt werden. 
 
Kapitel 3 zeigt, dass Unternehmen, welche F&E Inputs von internationalen statt von 
einheimischen externen Akteuren beziehen, mit höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit Produkte mit einem 
höheren Neuheitsgrad einführen. Im Gegensatz dazu ist einheimische externe F&E signifikant 
und positiv mit Produktimitation korreliert, hat aber auch einen signifikant negativen Effekt auf 
Produktinnovation. Diese Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Bezug von F&E Inputs von einheimischen 
externen Akteuren eine riskante Strategie zur Erlangung radikaler Produktinnovationen darstellt. 
IX 
 
An Stelle dessen sollten Unternehmen versuchen, Wissen auf internationalen Märkten zu 
akquirieren. Wissensbasierte Güter, die von internationalen Märkten bezogen werden, sind 
aufgrund von verschiedenen Institutionen und Innovationsprozessen möglicherweise heterogener 
als solche Güter, die aus dem Inland bezogen wurden. Daher ist es wahrscheinlicher, dass 
Firmen, die internationale externe F&E beziehen, Produktinnovationen mit einem höheren 
Neuheitsgrad einführen. Firmen, welche ihre F&E Inputs vom internationalen Marktplatz 
beziehen, haben mehr Gelegenheit zur Neukombination von Wissen und erreichen von daher 
eine bessere Innovationsleistung als Wettbewerber, welche ausschließlich auf inländische 
Dienstleister zurückgreifen. Um Zugang zu Ressourcen, die im Inland unverfügbar sind, zu 
erlangen, müssen Unternehmen internationale Kontakte knüpfen und sich verlinken, um damit 
ihre Innovationsleistung zu verbessern. Politische Entscheidungsträger sollten Unternehmen zu 
internationalen Kollaborationen ermutigen und Wachstum durch die Akquise von externem 
F&E zu fördern. Im Einzelnen sollten Regierungen Restriktionen für das Outsourcing von F&E-
Aktivitäten im Ausland mindern und Unternehmen dabei helfen, passende Partner für F&E-
Kooperationen zu identifizieren. Besonders würde dies kleinen und mittelständischen Unternehmen 
helfen, welche Kollaborationen mit internationalen F&E-Anbietern wünschen und somit Zugang 
zum internationalen Wissenspool erlangen können. 
 
Kapitel 4 diskutiert zusätzlich die Leistungsimplikationen von F&E Outsourcing und bietet neue 
Erkenntnisse über die Beziehung zwischen dieser Strategie und der Erfindungsleistung. Obwohl 
Kapitel 3 signifikant zum Verständnis der Leistungsimplikationen von externer F&E beiträgt, kann 
es sein, dass das Messen von F&E Output durch Produktinnovationen nicht die Gesamtqualität der 
Forschungsleistung des Unternehmens wiederspiegelt. Eine Produktinnovation kann zum Beispiel 
das Resultat der Kombination verschiedener externer Wissensinputs sein und ist somit eventuell 
kein guter Indikator für die Qualität von internen F&E-Aktivitäten. Sprich, Wissens- und 
Produktionsmöglichkeiten von Unternehmen können sich unterscheiden. Aus diesem Grund wird 
in Kapitel 4 näher untersucht, wie F&E Outsourcing mit dem Wert des Forschungsoutouts eines 
Unternehmens zusammenhängt (in Bezug auf Qualität sowie Quantität der hervorgebrachten 
Erfindungen und Innovationen). Um diesen Sachverhalt zu untersuchen, kombinieren wir Daten 
des Mannheimer Innovationspanels mit Patentdaten des Europäischen Patentamtes. Die zuerst 
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genannte Quelle bietet detaillierte Informationen zu Innovationsaktivitäten deutscher 
Unternehmen, während letztere Daten zu Patentanmeldungen in der EU beinhaltet. 
 
Die Ergebnisse der Datenanalyse lassen vermuten, dass jene Firmen, welche ihre F&E 
Aufgaben an spezialisierte Forschungsorganisationen auslagern, mehr Erfindungen generieren 
als Wettbewerber, die auf diese Auslagerung verzichten. Gegebenenfalls, da F&E Outsourcing 
in den Gebieten stattfindet, in denen das Unternehmen selbst keine hochgradige Expertise 
besitzt, kann dies dazu führen, dass die Effizienz und Effektivität der Innovationsleistung des 
Unternehmens gesteigert wird, da dieses sich so auf seine Kernkompetenzen fokussieren kann. 
Nichtsdestotrotz scheint diese positive Leistungsimplikation von F&E Outsourcing nicht für 
die Qualität der Erfindungen zu gelten. Genauer gesagt kann eine insignifikante Beziehung 
zwischen F&E Outsourcing und Qualität der Erfindungen festgestellt werden. Des Weiteren 
deuten die empirischen Untersuchungen daraufhin, dass großskalierte F&E Auslagerungen weder 
mit signifikanter Quantität an neuen Erfindungen, noch mit einer besonders hohen Qualität dieser 
Erfindungen korreliert ist. Aufgrund der limitierten Daten war es nicht möglich zu untersuchen, 
was die Beziehung zwischen F&E Outsourcing und Qualität der Erfindung antreibt oder wie die 
Intensität dieser Strategie und die Erfindungsleistung (Qualität und Quantität) zusammenhängt. 
Um die Erfindungsleistungsimplikationen von F&E Outsourcing genau zu verstehen, ist es 
notwendig in Betracht zu ziehen, ob F&E an Anbieter, Beratungen oder Forschungsinstitute 
ausgelagert wird. Das letzte Kapitel diskutiert diese und andere Anwendungsgrenzen, die in 




1 Introduction  
1.1 Motivation  
Innovation2 is considered to be a key element of a firm’s competitive advantage (Schumpeter, 
1934). This induces firm managers to invest in research and development (R&D) activities, but 
to create and commercialize inventions3 they need to apply an appropriate R&D management 
practice (Chesbrough, 2003). For this reason, the discussion about how to set R&D boundaries is 
attracting substantial attention from scholars and practitioners (Powell, 1990; Powell et al., 1996; 
Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Schmiedeberg, 2008; Enkel et al., 
2009; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Berchicci, 2013). In particular, whether it is more advantageous 
to organize R&D activities internally or externally is subject to intensive discussion 
(Chesbrough, 2003, 2006; Langlois, 2003, 2004; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Schmiedeberg, 
2008), but the conclusions are far from being straight forward.  
 
Rather generally, historical accounts suggest that the choice between different economic 
organizational forms depends on the costs of the coordination technologies and the extent of the 
market (Smith, 1776/1976; Leijonhufvud, 1986; Langlois, 2003, 2004). Specifically, the 
literature proposes that when the transportation and communication costs are high and the extent 
of the market is small, it might be more advantageous to organize economic activities internally 
to ensure the quality and quantity of certain inputs and, at the same time, to reduce the 
transaction costs related to an external governance mode (Langlois, 2003, 2004). In other words, 
as the number of specialized suppliers in a small-sized market can be low and, hence, certain 
goods and services may not be available on a competitive basis, the internal organizational form 
may be more beneficial due to the advantages associated with economies of scale. In contrast, 
once the costs of the coordination technologies diminish and the extent of the market grows, the 
economic organizational structure might be shifted from the internal to the external governance 
mode to acquire cheap inputs from cost-effective suppliers as well as to source valuable 
resources from a wide set of external actors dispersed across various geographical locations 
(Langlois, 2003, 2004). Indeed, in the early period, when the communication costs were high and 
the extent of the market was relatively small, the internal-R&D-oriented approach was more 
                                                          
2Innovation is defined as the act of introducing a novel method, good or service to a market (Nelson, 1993). 
3Invention is a process of generating a novel device. 
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prevalent, because it allowed companies to decrease their transaction costs and also to benefit 
from the scale effect (Chandler, 1977, 1990; Langlois, 2003). A large research effort exhibits 
greater productivity not only because the fixed cost of R&D is spread over multiple projects, but 
also because it permits firms to capture knowledge spillovers through investing in different R&D 
projects internally (Chandler, 1990). Consequently, this approach allows companies to achieve 
efficiency and effectiveness in their R&D activities. However, the advantages of the internal-
R&D-oriented framework may be less significant when the costs of coordination technologies 
diminish and valuable resources are accessible from a large number of specialized suppliers 
(Langlois, 2003). In fact, as the development of the Internet and related technologies allows 
firms to work with external actors around the world at a very low cost, the value of the internal-
R&D-oriented approach has eroded (Chesbrough, 2003). Instead, firms have increased their 
degree of R&D openness to source external resources and to develop innovation relatively 
quickly and inexpensively (Chesbrough, 2003; O’Conner, 2006; Keupp and Gassmann, 2009). 
This trend towards more R&D openness is referred to as open innovation, a process in which 
organizational boundaries are porous and a firm strongly engages in interaction with external 
actors (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006).  
 
In open innovation, firms develop innovation jointly with external actors or acquire ready R&D 
results from them. This allows companies to accelerate and improve their innovation activities 
and to respond swiftly to new market threats and opportunities (Chesbrough, 2003; Keupp and 
Gassmann, 2009). However, shifting attention from the internal-R&D-oriented approach towards 
the open innovation framework can also be a risky business in terms of eroding firms’ internal 
innovation capabilities and, as a result, undermining their innovation performance. Motivated by 
these contradictory arguments, the thesis aims to study the antecedents and performance 
implications of the open innovation approach. In particular, this PhD dissertation intends to 
explore whether it is a cost- or a resource-oriented logic that encourages firms to adopt the open 
innovation framework. It also aims to study when and how companies combine different open 
innovation strategies to achieve the best possible outcome. Moreover, the thesis examines how 
the open and distributed R&D approach is associated with product imitation and innovation as 




To achieve these objectives, three empirical studies are presented in Chapter 2 to Chapter 4, 
which examine various inter-related research questions. Furthermore, the remainder of this 
chapter provides theoretical arguments to precede the empirical analyses. For this purpose, 
Section 1.2 presents the definition and novelty of open innovation and discusses the antecedents 
to R&D openness. Section 1.3 studies the boundary conditions in open innovation. Section 1.3 
examines the inter-relationship between absorptive capacity and R&D openness and, 
subsequently, Section1.5 reviews the three main chapters of the dissertation. 
 
1.2 The notion of open innovation 
1.2.1 The definition and novelty of open innovation 
The notion of open innovation, introduced by Chesbrough (2003), has gained considerable 
attention within academia and the business community. Chesbrough suggests that there has been 
a fundamental transformation in the way in which firms develop and commercialize inventions. 
In particular, companies have shifted their innovation activities from a closed to an open model 
(Chesbrough, 2003, 2006). The closed innovation framework refers to an internal-R&D-oriented 
approach in which innovation takes place within the formal boundaries of the firm. On the 
contrary, the open innovation approach considers research and development as an open system 
in which knowledge purposefully inflows and outflows across organizational boundaries to 
accelerate and improve the internal innovation activities of the firm (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006). 
To put it another way, the open innovation concept refers to a process in which the 
organizational boundaries are porous and the firm collaborates with a wide set of external actors 
on innovation (Laursen and Salter, 2006).  
 
However, neither R&D openness in general nor external collaboration in particular is a new 
phenomenon. As Grönlund et al. (2010: 10) suggest, ‘external collaboration is as old as the first 
invention’, implying that research and development activities have always been open (at some 
level) to external ideas and technologies. For this reason, some scholars argue that the idea of 
open innovation is not new (Christensen, 2006; Trott and Hartmann, 2009). Before Chesbrough 
(2003) coined the open innovation concept, a number of scholars had already proposed that 
innovation practice spans organizational boundaries (Christensen, 2006; West et al., 2006). In 
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particular, two streams of literature can be differentiated that study external sources of 
innovation. The first stream of literature focuses on user-driven innovation (von Hippel, 1988; 
Lundvall, 1992; von Hippel and Katz, 2002). As the literature suggests, collaboration with 
customers or users helps a producer to understand the market needs better, to decrease the errors 
in an early new product development process and to improve the quality of a product innovation 
(Lundvall, 1992).  
 
The second stream of literature developed from the observation that collective action, interaction 
and knowledge sharing are the source of innovation (Allen, 1983). Hence, among the different 
locations where innovation takes place, such as non-profit organizations (i.e. universities, 
research institutions, etc.), profit-seeking firms and the mind of individual inventors (Nelson, 
1959, 1962), the interaction between actors is an additional institution that drives innovation and 
this institution is labelled collective invention (Allen, 1983). The notion of collective invention 
refers to a setting in which technical knowledge is freely exchanged between individuals or 
economic organizations (Cowan and Jonard, 2003). One of the best examples of the collective 
invention approach is open-source software, which is publicly available and developed by a 
group of individuals based on the principle of open and free knowledge exchange (von Hippel 
and von Krogh, 2003). Nowadays, it is common practice between computer programmers to 
share algorithms via the Internet and to help each other in solving programming-related 
problems. By doing so, the development process of new hardware and software programs is 
greatly improved and accelerated in the computer industry. Motivated by these advantages 
associated with knowledge sharing and collective invention, firms collaborate with a wide set of 
external actors and form networks for the purpose of accelerating and improving their R&D 
activities as well as minimizing the costs and risks of internal R&D projects (Powell, 1990; 
Powell et al., 1996). Networked innovation implies that independent economic actors and 
organizations devote their resources to common R&D projects to cope with the increased 
complexity of product and technology development (Powell et al., 1996).  
 
Given that the open innovation model shares a common perspective with user and collective 
innovation as well as with inter-organizational or networked innovation studies, a question arises 
concerning the extent to which this new concept contributes to the literature. First of all, one 
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should note that the open innovation approach incorporates many already existing techniques or 
strategies into one term (Huizingh, 2011). Accordingly, the open innovation concept has induced 
the academic and business community to rethink the R&D organizational structure (Huizingh, 
2011). In particular, the open innovation literature focuses on boundary conditions in R&D 
activities and studies how firms can gain competitive advantages through pursuing and 
combining different forms of R&D openness. As the open innovation framework refers to ‘a 
paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas, and internal and external 
paths to market, as the firms look to advance their technology’ (Chesbrough, 2006: 2), a number 
of opportunities are available for firms to develop and commercialize innovation within this 
framework. For instance, Enkel et al. (2009) differentiate outside-in and inside-out 
organizational processes in open innovation. The former process allows firms to utilize 
knowledge from a wide set of external actors and, in this way, to accelerate and improve their 
innovation activities. The latter process, by contrast, enables companies to open up their 
knowledge-based resources to external exploitation and, in this way, to enlarge the marketplace 
for internally generated inventions. Firms also ‘combine the outside-in process (to gain external 
knowledge) with the inside-out process (to bring ideas to market) and, in doing so, firms jointly 
develop and commercialize innovation’ (Enkel et al., 2009: 313). In this context, the open 
innovation framework refers to a business model that can help firms to improve and accelerate 
their innovation activities through exploring internally and externally available ideas and 
technologies.  
 
More importantly, the open innovation concept suggests that internal R&D has lost its strategic 
significance (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006). Instead, internal and external knowledge sources are 
given equal importance in innovation (Chesbrough, 2006). For instance, Procter & Gamble 
(P&G) has adopted the connect and develop (C&D) framework in innovation to involve a wide 
set of external actors from around the world in internal problem-solving activities (Chesbrough, 
2003; Dodgson et al., 2006). The C&D approach implies that P&G sources half of its ideas and 
technologies for internal innovation activities from outside the company. The management team 
of the company realized that there are more scientists and engineers outside the organizational 
boundaries working in the same areas of technologies as P&G and they may possess superior 
skills or competencies to its internal R&D staff (Dodgson et al., 2006). For this reason, P&G 
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increased its degree of openness in innovation to work with high-quality scientists and engineers 
inside and outside the company. This approach also allows P&G to share the costs and risks of 
R&D with external actors and to accelerate its innovation activities. Given these advantages 
associated with external knowledge sourcing, innovation activities have become more open and 
market-oriented. As a result, the role of internal R&D has shifted ‘from discovery generation as 
the primary activity to system design and integration as the key function’ (West et al., 2006: 10), 
implying that the internal R&D team (in most large corporations) performs the integration and 
system assembly task – combining internally and externally developed technologies (Prencipe et 
al., 2003; Allio, 2005).  
 
1.2.2 Antecedents to open innovation 
1.2.2.1 Information and communication technologies  
This increased trend towards the open innovation framework is greatly facilitated by the recent 
progress of information and communication technologies (ICTs) (Chesbrough, 2003; Dodgson et 
al., 2006). As modern ICTs allow firms to source knowledge from a wide set of external actors at 
very low costs, the value of the internal-R&D-oriented approach has diminished (Dodgson et al., 
2006). Instead, firms have increased their degree of openness in innovation and shifted their 
attention from internal to external knowledge sources. 
 
In the open innovation strategy, various ICT tools can be used to access and utilize globally 
dispersed valuable ideas and technologies. For instance, ICTs enable companies to create a 
virtual team to work simultaneously with highly talented individuals around the world 
inexpensively (Ebrahim et al., 2009). The virtual team is defined as a geographically dispersed 
group of individuals working on a common project and interacting via ICTs (Gassmann and Von 
Zedtwitz, 2003; Powell et al., 2004; Ebrahim et al., 2009). As a result, it allows firms to work 
efficiently with external actors across national boundaries and, in this way, to improve their 
innovation activities as well as to reduce the time and cost of new product development. 
 
In addition, ICTs give firms the possibility to post innovation-related problems in an open 
marketplace via the Internet and then to induce individuals to provide solutions to the problem 
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by rewarding the winning participants financially (von Hippel and Katz, 2002; Füller et al., 
2004; Bretschneider et al., 2008; Poetz and Schreier, 2012). This approach is often used to 
involve users in product innovation-related problem-solving activities (Sawhney and Prandelli, 
2000; von Hippel and Katz, 2002), which can be attained through displaying the product’s virtual 
prototype on the Internet and then inviting users to express their opinions and to suggest various 
options for improving the new product concept. For example, P&G induces customers to 
participate in the elaboration of a new product design; then, those with the best ideas are given 
the status of R&D advisors and invited to work with the firm’s R&D team (Füller et al., 2004). 
Similarly, LEGO and Dell conduct idea competitions to improve their existing and new product 
models via the Internet, and the winning participants are then financially rewarded 
(Bretschneider et al., 2008; Poetz and Schreier, 2012). This approach helps firms to upgrade a 
new product design before introducing it to the market (Füller and Matzler, 2007). As a 
consequence, with the help of ICTs, firms can substantially increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of their innovation activities. 
 
1.2.2.2 The globalization of markets  
The development of ICTs has also had an indirect effect on increasing the popularity of open 
innovation among practitioners. In particular, with the enormous cost reduction of coordination 
technologies, the integration process of domestic markets has increased, which in turn has 
induced firms to reshape their organizational structure and to adopt to the more open or 
distributed R&D model. In other words, the globalization of markets stimulates firms to 
collaborate with a wide set of external actors across different geographical locations (von 
Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; von Zedtwitz et al., 2004). This can be explained by several 
factors. First, firms internationalize their R&D activities to explore the requirements of foreign 
markets (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; von Zedtwitz et al., 2004; Cantwell and Mudambi, 
2005). As the needs and preferences of customers differ across countries, firms collaborate with 
international entities with the purpose of adapting their products to the tastes and needs of 
customers abroad (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002). Second, there is a cost-based logic 
implying that the internationalization of R&D activities allows companies to purchase cheap 
inputs from low-cost countries (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; von Zedtwitz et al., 2004). 
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Hence, acquiring some R&D inputs from international marketplaces may help firms to improve 
the efficiency of their innovation activities. Third, companies collaborate with international 
actors to access ideas and technologies that are unavailable internally (von Zedtwitz and 
Gassmann, 2002; von Zedtwitz et al., 2004; Lewin et al., 2009; Nieto and Rodriguez, 2011). 
Given that knowledge-based resources vary across countries due to the different innovation 
systems (Cantwell, 1989), R&D internationalization enables firms to tap into the global 
knowledge pool and to keep abreast of the technologies developed by foreign companies. To put 
it another way, companies organize R&D on a global scale to diversify their external knowledge 
sources and to access resources that are unavailable within their home country (von Zedtwitz and 
Gassmann, 2002; von Zedtwitz et al., 2004; Lewin et al., 2009; Nieto and Rodriguez, 2011). 
Furthermore, the globalization of markets increases the competitive pressure and accelerates the 
pace of technological changes, forcing firms to distribute their R&D activities and to search for 
resources globally to accelerate and improve their innovation activities (Chesbrough, 2003; 
Gassmann et al., 2010). In addition, rapid technological changes induce firms to increase their 
organizational flexibility to respond effectively to market threats and opportunities (Chesbrough, 
2003). However, to gain from R&D openness and to avoid the drawbacks related to open 
innovation, the way in which firms should set boundaries in open innovation requires careful 
consideration.    
 
1.3 Open innovation and boundary conditions 
1.3.1 Integrated and disintegrated R&D models 
According to Chesbrough (2006: 2), open innovation is defined ‘as the antithesis of the 
traditional vertical integration model’. The term vertical integration refers to an organizational 
structure in which a single firm owns its suppliers and users. This structure enables companies to 
control their value chain and to carry out all the economic activities within their formal 
boundaries. As a consequence, the vertically integrated research organization may allow firms to 
attain economies of scale and scope in R&D activities (Chandler, 1977, 1990; Langlois, 1999). 
The former implies increasing returns to scale, which arise from reusing knowledge and 
spreading the fixed R&D costs over a large number of identical R&D activities, whereas the 
latter refers to increasing returns to scope arising when common tangible and intangible 
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resources are shared over different R&D projects (Langlois, 1999). In this context, vertical 
integration may permit firms to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their R&D activities. 
However, vertical integration can also be a risky business model under rapid technological 
changes. In particular, given that a technological change is often ‘competence-destroying to 
firms and their suppliers’ (Afuah, 2001: 1), integrating vertically with or acquiring other 
companies to access their capabilities and competencies may restrain firms’ strategic flexibility. 
An alternative option is to disintegrate vertically and to use a market mechanism to acquire the 
resources needed. This may allow firms to switch suppliers relatively easily when a new 
competence-destroying technology emerges on a market (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; 
Chesbrough, 2003). In other words, the cost of disintegrating from the vertical organization and 
selling an acquired firm might be higher than the cost of withdrawing from a contract 
relationship. Afuah (2001: 1) suggests that when a new competence-destroying technology 
emerges on the market, ‘firms that are integrated vertically into the new technology will perform 
better than those that are not. At the same time, firms that had been vertically integrated into the 
old technology will perform worse than those that had not been’. Given that, nowadays, it is a 
challenging task to forecast the technological requirements for long-term success, the advantages 
of the vertical integration business model are significantly reduced (Harrigan, 1984, 1985; 
Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986; Chesbrough, 2003). For this reason, a number of firms have 
shifted their economic organizational structure from the integrated to the disintegrated business 
model to increase their strategic flexibility and to react quickly to market threats and 
opportunities (Ulset, 1996; Chesbrough, 2003; Calantone and Stanko, 2007). However, an 
alternative line of reasoning suggests that when firms face rapid changes in markets and 
technologies, they integrate vertically to generate their own inputs and to avoid dependency on 
external suppliers (Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Williamson, 1985; Monteverde, 1995).  
 
These contradictory arguments about the advantages of the integrated and disintegrated business 
models in dealing with rapid technological changes cause ambiguity regarding how firms should 
set boundaries to improve their R&D activities. Historical accounts suggest that firms often 
reshape their organizational structure in response to changes in the external environment 
(Langlois, 2003, 2007). To survive in a dynamic market environment, firms need to adjust their 
organizational structures to the market conditions. ‘Like a biological organism, an organization 
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confronts an environment that is changing, variable and uncertain. To survive and prosper, the 
organization must perceive and interpret a variety of signals from the environment and adjust its 
conduct in light of those signals’ (Langlois, 2007: 66). For this reason, the economic 
organizational structure greatly depends on the market environment and the problems that firms 
need to solve. Hence, explaining the underlying factors that induce firms to integrate or 
disintegrate vertically (to use the intra- and inter-organizational division of labour) requires a 
historical look at the market and industry evolution to understand the reasons behind the 
systemic changes in boundary conditions (Langlois, 2003; Jacobides, 2005). 
 
1.3.2 A brief historical look at market and industry evolution  
Since Adam Smith, there have been many debates about the advantages associated with the 
division of labour. In Smith’s view, the division of labour leads to higher productivity, because 
specialization in one particular task enables workers to improve their efficiency through 
performing the same task repetitively (Smith, 1776/1976). As an illustrative example, he 
contrasts craft and factory production in pin-making (Smith, 1776/1976; Leijonhufvud, 1986). 
The former refers to individual production in which each craftsman specializes in a wide range 
of tasks to carry out the entire operation necessary to make a pin. The latter stands for team 
production in which the pinproduction process is decomposed into separate operations and these 
operations are completed by distinct workers (Leijonhufvud, 1986). By task division, the 
organizational form of factory production allows workers to concentrate on a narrow range of 
specialization and, as a result, to improve their productivity (Smith, 1776/1976; Leijonhufvud, 
1986). For this reason, factory production is seen as more efficient than craft production, but the 
choice between these two productionforms depends on the extent of the market (Smith, 
1776/1976); ‘when the extent of the market is small, clearly production will be local, small in 
scale and oriented to markets’ (Langlois, 2004: 370). On the contrary, once the extent of the 
market increases, the economic organizational structure will shift from craft to factory 
production and the division of labour will increase in the production system (Smith, 1776/1976; 
Leijonhufvud, 1986). Indeed, in the early period, when the transportation and communication 
costs were high and consequently the extent of the market was small, production was mainly 
fragmented and decentralized to serve isolated local markets (Langlois, 2003, 2004). As 
production was small in scale in this period, labour was undivided and local producers 
11 
 
specialized in a wide range of activities. This situation changed substantially in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the progress of coordination technologies, such as 
train and telegraph, reduced the transportation and communication costs (Langlois, 2003). The 
development of coordination technologies in turn facilitated the integration of regional markets 
and, as a result, the distributed and local market-oriented production system was replaced by the 
centralized or vertically integrated organizational structure (Chandler, 1977; Leijonhufvud, 1986; 
Langlois, 2003). This happened at least for two reasons. First, the reduced costs of transportation 
and communication allowed firms to serve large markets at relatively low costs (Langlois, 2003, 
2004). This enabled producers to organize their economic activities in a specific location and to 
ship goods to remote markets (Langlois, 2003). Second, as the increased extent of the market 
allowed producers to attain economies of scale, the organizational form of the production system 
was changed to serve mass markets (Chandler, 1977). In particular, a complex production system 
was decomposed into simpler tasks, which were then assigned to distinct workers, implying that 
the division of labour increased among production operations (Chandler, 1977; Leijonhufvud, 
1986). The production process was also standardized with the help of machinery technologies, 
which allowed producers to accelerate the working process and also to minimize qualitative 
variation and human errors in operations by assigning workers to manage machinery tools 
(Langlois, 2004). At the same time, such an economic organizational form enabled firms to 
reduce their average production costs. In other words, ‘larger markets allowed a shift to higher-
fixed-cost methods, which were capable of lowering unit costs – often dramatically – at high 
levels of output’ (Langlois, 2007: 72). Thus, the development of coordination technologies and, 
as a result, the enlarged extent of the market played a major role in shifting the economic 
organizational structure from the fragmented and localized production system towards the 
integrated business model in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
In contrast, the further progress of coordination technologies had a substantially different effect 
on the economic organizational form in the late twentieth century. More specifically, the 
development of the Internet and personal computers promoted the globalization of domestic 
markets (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; von Zedtwitz et al., 2004), which in turn allowed 
firms not only to increase their product sales abroad, but also to acquire cheap inputs from low-
cost countries and to tap into the global knowledge pool. As valuable knowledge became 
distributed worldwide, firms increased their international collaboration to keep track of various 
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fields of technological development and to access resources that were unavailable within their 
home market (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; von Zedtwitz et al., 2004; Lewin et al., 2009; 
Nieto and Rodriguez, 2011). For these reasons, the trends towards the disintegration of product 
development functions increased, implying that the new product development process is 
decomposed so that some activities are executed internally while others are purchased from 
domestic and international suppliers.  
One may ask why the progress of coordination technologies and the growth extent of the market 
had a substantially different effect on the economic organizational structure in the early and the 
late twentieth century. It might be due to the fact that ‘in the early stages of an industry’s 
evolution when certain inputs are not available in competitive supply, vertical integration may be 
necessary to assure the quality or quantity of supply’ (Teece, 2010: 307). On the contrary, when 
an industry grows and goods/services are accessible from a large number of specialized 
suppliers, the needs for vertical integration may diminish (Langlois, 2003). In this sense, as 
industries were in the early stage of development in the early twentieth century, vertical 
integration was essential to develop the required resources in common ownership. This situation 
changed in the later period, when economic globalization allowed firms to acquire cheap and 
high-quality inputs from domestic and international suppliers, which in turn induced firms to 
disintegrate their production development functions and to outsource some of their operations to 
external actors (Langlois, 2003). Moreover, ‘because information can be shared instantly and 
inexpensively among many people in many locations, the value of centralized decision making 
and expensive bureaucracies decreases’ (Malone and Laubacher, 1998: 147). However, to 
understand how the boundaries are set between the firm and the market, a closer look at 
transaction cost theory (TCT) and the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm is required.  
 
 
1.3.3 Transaction cost theory 
TCT considers internal and external governance modes based on their relative costs; when the 
market offers a certain good or service at a lower price than organizing the same activities 
internally then a buy strategy is considered to be optimal (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). TCT 
assumes that ‘transactions within integrated companies may be insulated from competitive 
pressure and subject to bureaucratic phenomena’ (Geyskens et al., 2006: 520). In this context, the 
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market mechanism might be superior to the internal organization form, because the market 
competition forces suppliers to improve their efficiency and to lower their prices. However, the 
transaction or coordination costs might increase when firms use the market mechanism instead of 
the internal governance mode, because monitoring and enforcing a contract performance is often 
problematic due to bounded rationality, opportunism and asset specificity (Williamson, 1975). 
According to Simon (1957), humans have limited cognitive ability in spite of the assumption of 
their rationality. Hence, limited cognitive ability prevents firm managers from foreseeing all the 
possible opportunistic actions of their contractors. Opportunism is defined as the disregard of the 
contract partners or the defeat strategy that may also reduce the total welfare. To avoid such 
situations, firm managers attempt to write a complete contract; this, however, is only 
accomplishable when the contracted quantity and quality of specific assets are readily observable 
and measurable, which certainly is not the case with the outcome of product and process 
innovation activities. Usually, those activities are characterized by high levels of uncertainty with 
regard to outcomes (Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). Related to that, it is difficult to estimate the 
period of time and the resources required to fulfil certain research and development tasks. Hence, 
contracting those activities out will lead to high transaction costs (for monitoring the processes 
and results). To avoid excessive transaction costs, internal, rather than external, organizational 
forms for innovation activities appear to be more appropriate.  
 
However, the transaction costs related to the market mechanism will be substantially lowered if a 
firm manages to modularize its innovation activities. Modularity implies that a complex 
engineering system is decomposed into discrete components, which are developed separately and 
then interconnected with a standardized interface to assemble the final product (Langlois, 2002; 
Mikkola, 2003). This makes the inter-organizational division of labour possible at very low 
transaction costs through minimizing the interdependence between sub-components or modules 
(Mikkola, 2003). Hence, the modularization of product development functions enables firms to 
acquire some parts of R&D activities in the open marketplace. However, TCT alone does not 
explain why firms organize certain R&D activities internally and certain ones externally. As 
TCT is considered to be a cost-based approach, it neglects the learning processes embodied 
within internal and external governance modes. In other words, TCT focuses on minimizing 
transaction costs when considering which activities should be retained internally and which 
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should be contracted out, but it ignores the ideas and technologies available inside and outside 
the firm (Barney, 1999). Therefore, to provide a complete picture of how firms set R&D 
boundaries, I present insights from the RBV of the firm in the next section.  
 
 
1.3.4 The resource-based view of the firm 
The RBV of the firm further discusses the resource allocation issue and shifts the attention from 
a cost-based approach towards a resource-oriented framework (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991; 
Peteraf, 1993; Barney et al., 2001). In particular, the RBV of the firm suggests understanding the 
performance of a firm via its combination of specific resources. Resources can be tangible and 
intangible assets, such as physical assets, financial capital, human capital, organizational 
knowledge, information, managerial capabilities, etc. (Grant, 1991). According to the RBV, 
firms should possess valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (VRIN) resources to attain 
above-normal profits (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Valuable and rare resources enable firms to 
satisfy consumer requirements better than their competitors (Peteraf, 1993). Resources should 
also be inimitable and non-substitutable, because competitors should not be able to duplicate the 
valuable resources of the firm or to attain a comparable performance based on other resources. 
To develop VRIN resources, firms should define their organizational strengths and weaknesses 
relative to their rivals so that they can focus on the economic activities that they can perform best 
(Barney, 1991). As the internal governance mode is also considered to be one of the most 
powerful isolating mechanisms, organizing strategically important economic activities internally 
enables firms not only to build up valuable and rare resources but also to protect these resources 
from imitation (Wang et al., 2009; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). This is especially true in the case 
of R&D activities because protecting strategically important knowledge-based resources from 
imitation can be difficult once they have been revealed or contracted out to external actors 
(Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). For this reason, the RBV suggests that firms should concentrate on 
R&D functions in their core competency areas and use the market mechanism for rather 
peripheral or non-core activities (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). The 
term core competency refers to a firm’s unique capabilities that determine its competitive 
advantages from the long-term perspective (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). This core competency 
approach has become more relevant in the current fast-changing market environment, because 
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rapid technological changes and a shorter product life cycle deplete firms’ valuable resources 
and put pressure on them to pursue innovation (Chesbrough, 2003).  
 
As technological and product innovation also spans different scientific disciplines, many firms 
face a cognitive limitation in carrying out all the R&D tasks internally (Keupp and Gassmann, 
2009). The internal impediments to innovation are more critical under rapid technological 
changes, because undertaking radical transformation and developing new competitive 
capabilities internally, in the short run, can hardly be achieved without external collaboration 
(Powell et al., 1996; Chesbrough, 2003; Keupp and Gassmann, 2009). Therefore, firms increase 
their degree of R&D openness to collaborate with a wide set of external entities and to gain 
timely access to required resources that are otherwise unavailable (Powell et al., 1996). To 
reduce the transaction costs related to the external governance mode, complex innovation 
systems are decomposed into a small number of R&D subcomponents or tasks, which then are 
developed by distinct external actors (Mikkola, 2003). As a result, the modularization of 
innovation activities permits firms to benefit from several advantages. First, it allows firms to 
focus on their key research activities and to contract out those modules in which they have little 
or no competence. Such inter-firm division of labour enables companies to devote their financial 
and human resources to their core innovation activities and to acquire rather peripheral R&D 
functions from a specialized research organization to which these are the key activities (Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). As a result, the 
modularization of R&D functions may help firms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
their innovation activities. Second, as modules are developed separately, R&D activities shift 
from a serial to a parallel working process (Howells et al., 2003). Consequently, this approach 
allows firms to accelerate their innovation processes. Third, a modular product is more adaptive 
to changes in markets and technologies than a complete system (Langlois, 2002). In other words, 
a modular system enables companies to change internal parts of modules without altering the 
functionality of the entire system (Langlois, 2002; Mikkola, 2003). Hence, the modularization of 
product development functions increases a firm’s strategic flexibility.   
 
However, the core competency approach also has its negative side. In particular, firms that focus 
on a narrow set of core functions may fall into a competence trap (Leonard-Barton, 1992). To put 
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it another way, core competency may turn into core rigidity (Leonard-Barton, 1992). This might 
be due to the fact that organizational routines, which are developed over time through learning-
by-doing processes, often become a source of resistance to organizational changes and may lock 
firms into specific production activities (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
A routine is interpreted as ‘a functionally similar pattern of behavior in a given stimulus situation 
without explicitly selecting it over alternative ways of behaving’ (Gersick and Hackman, 1990: 
69). In this sense, concentrating on a narrow set of R&D activities (specializing in a certain 
technological domain) may cause structural inertia and, as a result, generate obstacles to 
adopting technological changes, because past learning is stored in the organizational memory 
and the further learning process is greatly affected by the previously accumulated knowledge 
stock (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Huber, 1991; Cyert and March, 1992), implying that ‘firms may 
be expected to behave in the future according to the routines they have employed in the past’ 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982: 134). Hence, the core competency framework may lead firms towards 
a competence trap and, as a result, undermine their performance (Leonard-Barton, 1992). To 
prevent such a situation, firms not only focus on the product development functions in their core 
competence areas, but also contain knowledge in the models that are contracted out to 
specialized research organizations. For example, Brusoni et al. (2001) suggest that firms know 
more than they make. Indeed, a number of empirical studies (based on patent data analysis) 
reveal that large technologically intensive firms decrease their product diversification, but 
broaden their technological knowledge base (Granstrand et al., 1997; Patel and Pavitt, 1997; 
Prencipe, 1997, 2000; Brusoni et al., 2001). In doing so, firms coordinate the acquisition of 
externally developed R&D modules more effectively and, at the same time, keep track of various 
fields of technological development that in turn may help them to avoid a competence trap in 
innovation activities. This approach suggests that firms assemble a final product internally but 
develop only a small part of the sub-technologies themselves (Prencipe et al., 2003), implying 
that companies emerge as system integrators (Christensen, 2006). This integrative competency 
framework is closely associated with the open innovation concept (Christensen, 2006), in which 
a firm strongly engages in interaction with external actors and the internal R&D team specializes 
in integrative competence to manage externally developed technologies (Chesbrough, 2003; 
Allio, 2005). The central argument in favour of open innovation is that a firm should increase its 
R&D openness to work with skilled labour inside and outside the company (Chesbrough, 2003). 
17 
 
As the number of specialized suppliers has increased during recent decades due to the growth 
extent of the market, firms are increasingly turning their attention towards external knowledge 
sources to acquire the resources they need and to develop innovation relatively quickly and 
inexpensively (Chesbrough, 2003; O’Connor, 2006). As a result, R&D activities have become 
more open and market-oriented.  
 
1.3.5 External knowledge sourcing in open innovation  
Drawing on the R&D management literature, scholars differentiate two generic strategies for 
sourcing external knowledge via formal contracts: i) outsourcing R&D functions and ii) 
developing innovation jointly (Narula, 2001; Nakamura and Odagiri, 2005; Grimpe and Kaiser, 
2010); the external actors are then R&D suppliers and innovation cooperation partners, 
respectively. The former strategy implies the acquisition of a research outcome from external 
actors, whereas the latter strategy refers to a joint effort of the partner firms to develop valuable 
knowledge assets. Given that these two strategies imply different types of external collaboration 
(Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010), firms may adopt a portfolio approach to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of their external knowledge sourcing. In other words, the choice between these 
strategies may depend on the knowledge-based resources that companies seek to acquire from 
external actors.  
 
1.3.5.1 Reasons for outsourcing R&D activities  
The main advantage attributed to R&D outsourcing is that this strategy allows firms to purchase 
ready R&D results without substantial involvement in the innovation activities, which are 
contracted out to specialized research organizations (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). In this context, 
R&D outsourcing permits firms to concentrate on core R&D activities internally and to 
outsource rather peripheral R&D tasks to external suppliers (Quinn, 1999, 2000; Grimpe and 
Kaiser, 2010). As a consequence, firms may achieve several potential gains from R&D 
outsourcing. First, innovation costs can be considerably reduced through acquiring cheap R&D 
inputs from cost-effective suppliers (Calantone and Stanko, 2007; Howells et al., 2008; Grimpe 
and Kaiser, 2010). In general, competitive pressure forces external suppliers to increase their 
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efficiency and to reduce their production costs; for this reason, the outsourcing strategy can help 
firms to source some R&D inputs from specialized suppliers at low prices (Grimpe and Kaiser, 
2010). Usually, specialized suppliers attain cost effectiveness by selling the same inputs to 
multiple clients, which in turn allows them to attain economies of scale and, as a result, to reduce 
their unit costs. Second, R&D outsourcing allows firms to reduce the time period for new 
product and technology development. This is achieved through distributing R&D tasks among 
specialized suppliers, that is, shifting innovation activities from serial to sequential working 
processes (Howells et al., 2003). Third, ‘an outsourcer is able to take advantage of emerging 
technology without investing significant amounts of capital in that technology’ (Gilley and 
Rasheed, 2000: 766). In other words, R&D outsourcing may help firms to build up a flexible 
organizational structure and to switch suppliers when more cost-effective technologies emerge 
on the market (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000). As technological capabilities are developed over time 
through the learning-by-doing process, firms may not be able to develop new technological 
competencies (in the short run) without external collaboration. For this reason, R&D outsourcing 
can be an important instrument to acquire resources that are unavailable internally (Howells et 
al., 2008). Fourth, by the division of R&D labour, firms increase the organizational commitment 
to the R&D activities that they can perform best and use the R&D service of specialized research 
organizations for rather peripheral innovation activities in which they lack competency (Quinn, 
1999, 2000; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). As a result, this R&D strategy may help firms to improve 
their innovation performance. 
Furthermore, considering the composition of knowledge resources, a number of studies suggest 
that a complementary rather than a substitutive relationship is more likely to result in superior 
performance (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Complementary 
resources allow firms to reconfigure their competencies by generating new combinations of 
existing resources to respond timely and effectively to new market opportunities and external 
threats. In this context, R&D activities can be seen as recombination activities, because an 
innovation is considered to be a new combination of the existing knowledge (Schumpeter, 1934). 
In this sense, a firm that possesses a heterogeneous stock of knowledge and competencies has 
more opportunities for knowledge recombination and performs better in innovation than others 
that apply a rather homogeneous knowledge base (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar, 2001; Cantner and Plotnikova, 2009). Taking into account that firms are heterogeneous 
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in terms of their resources due to their different routines and operation systems, which cause the 
formation and accumulation of diverse capabilities and competencies (Nelson and Winter, 1982), 
R&D outsourcing can help firms to access miscellaneous knowledge inputs and, as a result, to 
improve their innovation performance.  
Although R&D outsourcing promises the above-mentioned advantages, this governance mode is 
considered to be inappropriate when the knowledge-based resources that a client firm seeks to 
acquire from a specialized supplier are tacit in nature (e.g. skill, know-how), because the 
effective utilization of such knowledge requires intensive interaction with the knowledge holder 
(Narula, 2001; Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). For this reason, accessing tacit knowledge 
resources through R&D outsourcing may not be sufficient to learn and enrich the internal stock 
of knowledge.  
 
1.3.5.2 Reasons for engaging in innovation cooperation   
In contrast to R&D outsourcing, innovation cooperation implies joint R&D development 
whereby collaborative firms interact intensively to learn and generate new valuable knowledge 
assets (Hagedoorn, 1993; Tether, 2002). This intensive interaction process itself facilitates tacit 
knowledge exchange through building up trust-based relationships between employees coming 
from partner firms (Holste and Fields, 2010). For this reason, innovation cooperation is seen as a 
superior governance mode over R&D outsourcing in terms of utilizing the skills and know-how 
of external partners (Hamel, 1991; Sakakibara, 1997). Moreover, taking into account that product 
and technology innovation activities are often a complex and uncertain process, outsourcing such 
activities to an external provider may be an inefficient strategy due to the high level of 
information asymmetry between contract parties. In this case, it will be more appropriate to use 
innovation cooperation, because it is an intermediated governance mode between internal 
organization and market mechanism, which allows firms to keep a certain degree of control over 
transactions (Williamson, 1991). Therefore, innovation cooperation rather than R&D outsourcing 
can be a more viable option to deal with the contractual complexity of innovation activities.  
Furthermore, there are several other advantages associated with innovation cooperation. In 
particular, this strategy permits partner firms to improve their innovation activities through 
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pooling and combining heterogeneous knowledge inputs (Hagedoorn, 1993; Tether, 2002). The 
joint R&D effort allows collaborative parties not only to improve their innovation performance, 
but also to attain economies of scale in R&D and, hence, to diminish their costs and to increase 
the efficiency of their innovation processes (Sakakibara, 1997). In addition, combining the 
complementary skills and competencies embodied in partner organizations enables the contract 
parties to accelerate their innovation activities and, at the same time, to share the risks related to 
new product and technology development (Hagedoorn, 1993; Tether, 2002).  
 
1.3.5.3 International knowledge sourcing  
With the help of modern ICTs, R&D outsourcing and innovation cooperation strategies are also 
applied on the global scale. In other words, as there is substantial cost cutting in coordination 
technologies, firms intensively collaborate with domestic and international specialized R&D 
organizations to source valuable resources from excellent research laboratories spread across 
various geographical locations (von Zedtwitz et al., 2004). The primary motive in 
internationalizing R&D activities is to source resources that are unavailable within the domestic 
market (Lewin et al., 2009). Rather generally, resources may vary across countries due to the 
different institutional settings (Freeman, 1995). Taking into consideration that ‘national 
innovation systems help to shape firm capabilities and resources, […] knowledge resources are 
more homogeneous within a country and more heterogeneous across countries’ (Bertrand and 
Mol, 2013: 753). In this context, collaboration with international actors allows firms to diversify 
their external knowledge sources and to access complementary resources abroad (Lewin et al., 
2009; Bertrand and Mol, 2013). Hence, firms that source knowledge from international 
marketplaces are more likely to improve their innovation performance than their counterparts 
that rely only on domestic resources (Nieto and Rodriguez, 2011; Bertrand and Mol, 2013). 
However, as companies may differ across countries in terms of their knowledge bases, the level 
of understanding between them can be limited, which in turn can be a substantial obstacle to 
gaining from international collaboration (Bertrand and Mol, 2013). To safeguard against such a 
situation, firms need to possess large absorptive capacity to learn and utilize knowledge from 




1.4 Absorptive capacity and R&D openness 
Absorptive capacity refers to ‘the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external 
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends’ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 128). In 
particular, it stands for the pre-existing knowledge stock that allows a firm to identify and exploit 
external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). As the authors suggest, the prior 
knowledge structure within a firm determines its ability to learn and add new knowledge to its 
memory. In this sense, companies with a rich internal knowledge stock are more likely to gain 
from R&D openness in terms of absorbing knowledge from a wide set of external actors than 
their counterparts that lack the required level of competencies. However, learning performance 
depends not only on the amount of accumulated knowledge, but also on the prior related 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In other words, a firm is more likely to learn and 
acquire new knowledge in a particular area of the technological domain in which it has already 
accumulated some level of expertise. In contrast, learning in new and unfamiliar technological 
areas can be limited due to the lack of associated linkages between the firm’s knowledge basis 
and the new technological domain. For this reason, increasing the degree of R&D openness can 
hamper innovation performance. For instance, previous studies provide empirical evidence that 
over‐searching affects innovation performance negatively (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and 
Salter, 2006). More specifically, Katila and Ahuja (2002) study the search behaviour of 
manufacturing firms in the robotic industry, and they focus on two dimensions of knowledge 
search: ‘search depth, or how frequently the firm reuses its existing knowledge, and search 
scope, or how widely the firm explores new knowledge’ (1). The results of the study show that 
the search scope and depth have decreasing returns in innovation activities. Laursen and Salter 
(2006) further study this issue and provide similar results. In particular, they study UK 
manufacturing firms, grouping them based on their search strategy defined as breadth and depth. 
The breadth search strategy refers to diverse external knowledge sources, and the depth strategy 
is defined as how intensively firms use external knowledge sources in innovation. They also find 
out that searching for external knowledge too widely and deeply decreases the returns in product 
innovation. Hence, the studies show that increasing R&D openness may undermine firms’ 
innovation performance. To gain from R&D openness and avoid the associated risks, companies 
need to invest deliberately in internal R&D to develop the required level of expertise and to 
utilize knowledge from a wide set of external actors effectively.  
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1.5 Thesis structure and research questions 
In the previous sections, I presented theoretical arguments for why R&D activities have shifted 
from the closed to the open model and provided a general discussion of how firms set boundaries 
in open innovation. The primary purpose of this dissertation is to analyse empirically the 
conditions under which firms engage in one or other open innovation strategy and to identify the 
potential gains from different forms of R&D openness. In particular, this dissertation presents 
empirical studies that attempt to address the following research questions. First, do economic- 
and knowledge-related impediments induce firms to increase the scale of R&D outsourcing or 
the number of innovation cooperation partnerships? Second, (i) do domestic and international 
external R&D4 complement or substitute internal R&D and innovation cooperation and (ii) how 
do domestic and international external R&D relate to innovation performance? Third, how is the 
R&D outsourcing strategy associated with the value of the firm’s research output (in terms of 
invention quantity as well as quality)? 
 
To address these questions, the PhD dissertation presents three interconnected studies. The 
theoretical foundations of the studies are built upon transaction cost theory (TCT), the resource-
based view of the firm (RBV), the knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm and evolutionary 
economics. Based on these, theoretical arguments are provided and appropriate hypotheses are 
developed. To validate the hypotheses empirically, the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) is 
used in the empirical analyses. In particular, the empirical part of the first and third studies is 
based on the German part of the CIS, whereas the Danish part of the CIS is used in the empirical 
analysis of the second study. The former refers to the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) 
database, which is collected annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW). 
The main objective of the MIP is to explore the innovation behaviour of German firms. For this 
purpose, the survey provides a broad variety of information on innovation activities that gives 
the authors possibilities to examine empirically the driving factors of open innovation and to 
study the performance implication of R&D openness in the first and third papers, respectively. In 
contrast to the first and third studies, the second paper focuses on the international dimension of 
open innovation. For this reason, the Danish part of the CIS is used in the empirical analysis. The 
                                                          
4The terms external R&D and R&D outsourcing are used interchangeably in the thesis. 
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survey, which is collected by the Danish Statistical Office, provides information about Danish 
firms’ innovation activities at the national and international levels. 
 
The first two studies provided in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are based on co-authored work, to 
which each author made an equal contribution. The third study is a single-author paper and it is 
presented in Chapter 4. A summary of the three papers is offered in Chapter 5. In addition, I 
briefly review these three papers in the next part of this chapter. 
 
1.5.1 The journey towards open innovation: why do firms choose different routes? 
Chapter 2 contributes to the current debate about the driving factors of open innovation adoption. 
Recent studies discuss this theme intensively and conclude that ‘for explaining open innovation 
adoption the internal environment in firms is more important than the external environment’ 
(Huizingh, 2011: 5). In particular, Keupp and Gassmann (2009) provide empirical evidence that 
internal innovation impediments (i.e. finance-, risk- and information and skill-related) are one of 
the major factors that induce firms to source knowledge from a wide set of external actors. 
However, little is known about whether external knowledge sourcing is undertaken through 
innovation cooperation or R&D outsourcing under such innovation constraints. This 
differentiation is important because R&D outsourcing implies the acquisition of a research 
outcome from external entities, whereas innovation cooperation refers to joint R&D 
development. Thereby, these two strategies involve different types of learning, and firms may 
adopt a portfolio approach to deal adequately with the economic- and knowledge-related 
constraints.  
 
Furthermore, taking into account that R&D outsourcing implies the acquisition of ready R&D 
results without involvement in the related R&D problem-solving activities, it is less clear 
whether the primary purpose of using this strategy in innovation processes is cost–risk 
minimization or the knowledge-seeking objective. Although firms may attempt to achieve both 
of the objectives simultaneously through outsourcing their R&D activities, there is much 
suspicion regarding whether this strategy can be effective in realizing growth objectives (in 
terms of acquiring knowledge-based resources) (Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). Several factors 
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can be differentiated that make R&D outsourcing less effective for this purpose. First, learning 
certain skills and know-how is considered to be a function of involvement in related problem-
solving activities (Arrow, 1962). Second, utilizing tacit knowledge from an R&D provider 
requires intensive interaction with the knowledge holder (Weigelt, 2009; Mudambi and Tallman, 
2010). As neither of these is delivered by R&D outsourcing, scholars are concerned that relying 
greatly on this R&D strategy may hamper a firm’s innovation performance.  
 
Motivated by this issue, the study explores the effect of cost–risk- and knowledge-related 
innovation constraints on R&D outsourcing. Furthermore, to provide a holistic picture, R&D 
outsourcing is studied in comparison with innovation cooperation. Hence, this chapter examines 
whether economic- and knowledge-related constraints induce firms to increase the scale of R&D 
outsourcing or a number of innovation cooperation partnerships. 
 
 
1.5.2 The inter-relationship between external R&D, innovation cooperation and product 
innovation  
Chapter 3 focuses on the international dimension of open innovation and examines why and 
when firms combine different strategies in product innovation. More specifically, this study 
explores whether domestic and international external R&D complement or substitute other 
innovation strategies (i.e. domestic/international innovation cooperation and internal R&D). The 
debate about the inter-relationship between external and internal R&D has attracted considerable 
attention within academia (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Lokshin et al., 2008; Schmiedeberg, 
2008), because R&D management scholars are concerned that sourcing knowledge-based 
resources from external actors via external R&D or innovation cooperation may displace a firm’s 
internal innovation activities. This concern is related more to external R&D than to innovation 
cooperation, because the former strategy allows firms to acquire a research output from an R&D 
supplier without devoting time and resources to the related problem-solving activities. This, on 
the one hand, enables firms to reduce the costs and risks of R&D projects, to diminish the time of 
new product development and to access valuable external resources (Calantone and Stanko, 
2007; Howells et al., 2008). However, on the other hand, these may substitute internal learning 
processes and, as a result, hamper the firms’ innovation performance (Weigelt, 2009). Therefore, 
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to understand whether firms gain or lose from R&D outsourcing, scholars study whether this 
strategy complements or substitutes internal innovation activities. A complementary relationship 
between R&D strategies is considered to exist when ‘the implementation of one activity pays off 
more if the complementary activity is present, too. Thus, internal and external R&D being 
complements means that the performance of externally sourced R&D is higher if the firm 
conducts internal R&D at the same time and vice versa’ (Schmiedeberg, 2008: 1493). 
 
Rather generally, the theoretical arguments are in favour of the complementary relationship 
between external and internal R&D. In particular, the absorptive capacity concept suggests that 
firms need to invest in internal R&D to utilize external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Hence, those firms acquiring external R&D may improve their innovation performance if they 
simultaneously invest in internal R&D. This issue is also empirically examined by a number of 
studies, but the conclusions are rather ambiguous (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; 
Schmiedeberg, 2008). For example, while some studies provide evidence of complementarities 
between external and internal R&D (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006), others find a non-
significant relationship between them (Schmiedeberg, 2008). This ambiguous relationship 
between external and internal R&D might be driven by the fact that the geographical dimension 
of external R&D is largely neglected in these studies. In other words, as the utilization of 
external knowledge sourced from international, rather than from domestic, marketplaces may 
require an advanced level of internal capability (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; Bertrand 
and Mol, 2013), firms that acquire international external R&D may have a greater tendency to 
invest in internal R&D than those sourcing knowledge-based resources from domestic suppliers. 
This consideration of complementarity can also be extended to innovation cooperation. In other 
words, not only internal R&D, but also innovation cooperation can help firms to learn and 
develop internal capabilities. Hence, further research is required to understand whether firms 
sourcing external R&D from domestic or international marketplaces simultaneously pursue other 
innovation strategies.  
 
Besides that, this chapter explores the performance implication of domestic and international 
external R&D. Prior studies show that there is an increased tendency towards R&D 
internationalization (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; von Zedtwitz et al., 2004). The recent 
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substantial progress of ICTs has eased cross-country collaboration, which in turn has stimulated 
firms to source valuable resources from different geographical locations, to acquire cheap R&D 
inputs from low-wage countries and to gain access to foreign markets (von Zedtwitz et al., 2004). 
Although the importance of R&D internationalization is very well recognized by prior studies, 
we lack an understanding of whether firms that acquire international, rather than domestic, 
external R&D are more likely to introduce product innovation with a higher degree of novelty. 
Furthermore, this research explores how firms combine different innovation strategies in product 
imitation and innovation.    
 
1.5.3 The innovative performance of R&D outsourcing 
Chapter 4 studies the performance implication of R&D outsourcing. This topic has attracted 
substantial attention among scholars, practitioners and policy makers. Given that firms have 
increasingly turned their attention from the internal-R&D-oriented framework towards the open 
or distributed R&D approach (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006), a question arises concerning the 
consequence of outsourcing R&D functions. Prior studies discuss this issue intensively, but the 
conclusions are rather mixed and controversial. For instance, some studies suggest that R&D 
outsourcing is an important instrument for firms to survive in a fast-changing market 
environment (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000). It allows companies to gain strategic flexibility, to 
reduce the costs and risks of R&D projects, to speed up new product development and to 
improve their innovation performance (Quinn, 1999, 2000; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Howells 
et al., 2008). Such advantages of R&D outsourcing are derived by an inter-firm division of R&D 
labour that allows companies to specialize in a limited number of key activities that they can 
perform best and to contract out rather peripheral R&D functions in which they lack the required 
level of expertise. By doing so, firms aim to acquire cheap R&D inputs from cost-effective 
suppliers and to access valuable resources that are unavailable internally (Grimpe and Kaiser, 
2010). As a result, R&D outsourcing may help firms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of their innovation activities. Furthermore, this distributed R&D framework supports firms in 
shifting their innovation activities from serial to parallel working processes and, consequently, to 




However, a number of other studies highlight the drawbacks of R&D outsourcing, suggesting 
that this strategy may undermine firms’ innovation performance (Bettis et al., 1992; Weigelt, 
2009). In particular, as R&D outsourcing implies the acquisition of ready R&D results, it may 
substitute internal learning-by-doing and innovation-related problem-solving activities (Bettis et 
al., 1992; Weigelt, 2009), which are seen as essential to learning new skills and to developing 
firm-specific competencies. Moreover, as technological knowledge is often tacit in nature, 
acquiring knowledge-based resources through R&D outsourcing may not be sufficient to learn 
and enrich the internal stock of knowledge (Weigelt, 2009). Hence, R&D outsourcing may erode 
a firm’s internal innovation competencies and shift knowledge-creation capabilities from the 
company to an R&D supplier (Bettis et al., 1992). These mixed potential outcomes of R&D 
outsourcing in turn raise the question of whether firms gain or lose from outsourcing R&D 
activities. Some of the prior studies examine this issue empirically, but the value of R&D output 
in these studies is most commonly measured as the number of patents applied for (Beneito, 2006) 
and new product sales (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Berchicci, 2013), which may not reflect the 
overall quality of an outsourcer firm’s internal research processes. In other words, patents may 
differ with regard to their quality and innovation content (Trajtenberg, 1990; Griliches, 1990). As 
for product innovation, it can be a result of combining externally available resources (Brusoni et 
al., 2001). Hence, additional research is required to understand the innovative performance of 
R&D outsourcing. This chapter takes up this issue to examine how R&D outsourcing is 
associated with invention quantity and quality, which are measured as patent counts and patent 
forward citations, respectively. For this purpose, the MIP dataset is supplemented by patent data 
obtained from the European Patent Office (EPO) to examine the relationship between R&D 









Innovation processes have become more open and market-oriented during recent decades 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough et al., 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Dahlander and Gann, 
2010; Grönlund et al., 2010). Chesbrough (2003) suggests that companies have shifted their 
attention from an internal-R&D-oriented approach towards an open innovation framework to 
accelerate and improve their innovation activities. The open innovation framework implies that 
the boundaries between firms and the market are open and permeable, allowing firms to 
collaborate intensively with a wide set of external actors (Chesbrough, 2003; Laursen and Salter, 
2006). In other words, open innovation refers to a process in which firms balance their internal 
R&D activities and their degree of openness (Grönlund et al., 2010). Such changes in innovation 
management are associated with increased global competition and fast changes in the market 
environment (Chesbrough, 2003). As in modern days technological change is intensive and 
product life cycles are considerably shortened, many firms face internal economic- and 
knowledge-related constraints to accomplishing all their R&D activities internally (Chesbrough, 
2003; Keupp and Gassmann, 2009). In particular, the fast pace of technological and product 
changes implies considerable risks regarding the economic success of innovation activities. 
Furthermore, keeping track of various fields of technological development requires substantial 
financial, physical and human resources from a firm to conduct research across a broad 
spectrum. Accordingly, many companies lack adequate internal resources to cope with the 
increased complexity of product and technological innovation. For this reason, firms open up 
their innovation processes to share the costs and risks of R&D projects with external actors and 
to source the necessary resources from them (Chesbrough, 2003; Keupp and Gassmann, 2009).  
 
Once a firm has decided to open up its innovation processes, it should identify anappropriate 
governance mode for external collaboration to deal efficiently and effectively with internal 
innovation obstacles. The literature on R&D management identifies two forms of formal 
openness in innovation, innovation cooperation on the one hand and R&D outsourcing on the 
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other (Narula, 2001; Nakamura and Odagiri, 2005; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). The former 
strategy refers to a joint effort of contract partners in developing certain innovations, whereas the 
latter strategy stands for the acquisition of ready R&D results from external actors. The main 
advantage of external R&D compared with innovation cooperation is that it reduces a firm’s 
involvement in innovation activities; once R&D tasks have been accomplished by an external 
actor, the results are consequently transferred back and used in internal innovation processes. In 
this sense, R&D outsourcing allows firms to contract out rather peripheral R&D activities to 
external actors and to concentrate internally on the key activities that determine their competitive 
advantages (Quinn, 1999, 2000). In this way, this innovation strategy helps firms (i) to reduce 
the costs and risks of innovation processes and (ii) to acquire knowledge that is unavailable 
internally.  
In this context, an interesting question arises regarding which of these two aims the opening up 
of innovation processes is targeting. There has been much debate about this topic (Narula, 2001; 
Nakamura and Odagiri, 2005; Calantone and Stanko, 2007; Howells et al., 2008; Stanko and 
Calantone, 2011), but the conclusions are far from being straightforward. Concerning R&D 
outsourcing, although a firm may pursue cost–risk minimization and knowledge-seeking motives 
simultaneously and these motives do not exclude each other, there is doubt regarding whether 
this strategy can help firms to fulfil their growth objectives (Bettis et al., 1992; Weigelt, 2009; 
Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). Several factors make R&D outsourcing less effective for this 
purpose. First of all, learning new skills or competencies is considered to be a function of 
involvement in a problem-solving process (Arrow, 1962), which is not implied in R&D 
outsourcing. Secondly, transferring technological knowledge (which is often tacit in nature) 
across firms requires intensive interaction between them (Dhanaraj et al., 2004), which is more 
likely to be facilitated by innovation cooperation than R&D outsourcing (Narula, 2001; 
Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). Third, the resources acquired through R&D outsourcing may not 
be unique, because the R&D supplier may sell the same assets to multiple client firms or 
strategically important knowledge may spillover unintentionally from the R&D supplier to 
multiple client firms while working with them (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). For these reasons, 
R&D outsourcing may not be a relevant governance mode to acquire skills and know-how from 
external actors. Increasing the scale of R&D outsourcing may even reduce the tacit knowledge 
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application and learning-by-doing processes in internal research and, as a result, it may hamper 
the innovation performance of the firm (Bettis et al., 1992; Weigelt, 2009).  
Therefore, further research is required to identify the motives for using the R&D outsourcing 
strategy in innovation activities. In contrast to prior research, we study this issue from the open 
innovation perspective and undertake an empirical analysis to understand whether economic- or 
knowledge-related innovation impediments induce firms to increase the scale of their R&D 
outsourcing. We additionally study R&D outsourcing in comparison with innovation cooperation 
to understand under which internal innovation constraints firms engage in the one or the other. 
To study this issue, we analyse a three-year panel dataset of German manufacturing firms. The 
findings from the empirical analysis suggest that economic-related barriers do not play a 
significant role in the organizational decision to increase the degree of R&D openness (including 
both R&D outsourcing and innovation cooperation). This non-significant relationship might be 
related to the fact that R&D openness is itself a risky and costly process (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006). A high degree of openness in 
innovation may involve considerable transaction costs associated with enforcing a contract 
performance and integrating external knowledge into internal R&D. Another result of the 
empirical analysis shows that knowledge-related impediments to innovation are the major 
internal factor that drives a high degree of openness with regard to R&D outsourcing and 
innovation cooperation. It is surprising that knowledge-related obstacles to innovation are the 
primary motive for increasing the scale of R&D outsourcing, because this innovation strategy 
may not be an effective governance mode to enhance internal learning as well as to acquire tacit 
knowledge from external actors; therefore relying greatly on the R&D outsourcing strategy in 
innovation activities may deteriorate firms’ innovation performance (Weigelt, 2009; Grimpe and 
Kaiser, 2010). However, companies may complement R&D outsourcing with other innovation 
strategies (e.g. internal R&D, innovation cooperation) to facilitate knowledge utilization from 
R&D suppliers (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Lokshin et al., 2008; Schmiedeberg, 2008; 
Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010).  
The remainder of this chapter is organized in the following way. Section 2.2 discusses the related 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section 2.3 provides the dataset and variables used in the 
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empirical analysis. Section 2.4 presents the econometric methods. Section 2.5 discusses the 
findings from the empirical analysis, and Section 2.6 concludes.  
 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
In this section, we discuss the role of internal innovation constraints in designing the boundaries 
of the firm. More concretely, we study the effect of economic- and knowledge-related innovation 
impediments to openness with regard to R&D outsourcing and innovation cooperation. These 
innovation strategies can be important instruments for firms to cope with internal weaknesses in 
innovation (Narula, 2001; Chesbrough, 2003). As technological innovation is a complex process 
and often involves different scientific disciplines, many companies lack adequate internal 
resources to afford to undertake the entire innovation processes themselves (Chesbrough, 2003; 
Keupp and Gassmann, 2009). In this context, R&D openness can be a promising strategy for 
firms to deal with internal innovation barriers through acquiring the necessary resources from 
external actors or developing innovation jointly with them. However, R&D openness can also be 
a risky and costly process (Laursen and Salter, 2006). Shifting the focus from an internal-R&D-
oriented approach towards a more open or market-oriented innovation framework may increase 
the costs of integrating external knowledge into internal R&D (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), 
exhaust firm-specific resources (Weigelt, 2009) and, as a result, deteriorate the innovation 
performance of the firm (Laursen and Salter, 2006). Therefore, the pros and cons of different 
forms of R&D openness should be discussed to identify anappropriate external governance mode 
for dealing with internal innovation constraints efficiently and effectively. In this process, 
insights from transaction cost theory (TCT) and the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm can 
be helpful.     
 
Transaction cost theory 
The primary objective of TCT is to explain whether it is more efficient to organize economic 
activities inside or outside a company (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). In particular, TCT 
discusses internal and external governance modes based on their efficiency in minimizing 
production and transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). Production costs refer to the 
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costs of making goods or services, whereas transaction costs stands for the expenses incurred by 
gathering all the required information to coordinate an economic exchange between different 
units of a firm or with an external partner when the goods or services are acquired in a market 
(Williamson, 1975). Stated differently, the transaction costs associated with an internal 
governance mode can also be defined as administrative or bureaucratic costs, whereas in the case 
of an external governance mode, transaction costs are related to searching for appropriate 
contractors for certain economic activities, negotiating and bargaining with them to reach an 
acceptable agreement and then monitoring and enforcing the contract performance. Given that 
some external contractors may act unscrupulously or opportunistically to maximize their self-
interests (Williamson, 1975), firm managers attempt to write a complete contract to avoid 
unscrupulous behaviour from contractors. However, it might be a challenging task, because 
humans are considered to have bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). In other words, firm 
managers often face limited cognitive ability (despite their rationality) to foresee all the possible 
opportunistic actions of a contract partner and, therefore, to write a complete contract. This issue 
is more critical when the goods or services that firms aim to acquire in a market involve high 
levels of asset specificity, because it is difficult to measure the quantity and quality of such 
resources. In this situation, a contract is more likely to be incomplete and contractor parties will 
have more chances to engage in opportunism.  
A high level of asset specificity often characterizes innovation activities, because technological 
knowledge is partly of a tacit nature (e.g. skill, know-how), which is difficult to articulate or to 
define clearly (Polanyi, 1967; Kogut and Zander, 1992). Such knowledge is accumulated through 
learning by doing and it is embodied in individuals (Polanyi, 1967). For this reason, it is often 
problematic to transfer tacit knowledge across organizational boundaries, requiring a transaction-
specific investment and multiple interactions between organizations to facilitate such knowledge 
transfer across firm boundaries (Narula, 2001; Dhanaraj et al., 2004; Mudambi and Tallman, 
2010). In this sense, the effective utilization of knowledge-based resources obtained through 
R&D outsourcing may require high transaction costs and, as a result, this strategy might be a less 
attractive alternative to internalization. From the TCT perspective, R&D outsourcing is 
economically optimal only when it is possible to codify and standardize R&D tasks, allowing 
firms to purchase such types of goods or services from external actors without intensive 
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interaction with them, because codified knowledge can be fairly easily transferred between 
companies through verbal communication or in written forms. 
 
The resource-based view of the firm 
An alternative approach to explaining a ‘make’ or ‘buy’ decision is offered by the resource-based 
view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Barney et al., 2001). In contrast to TCT, in 
which the attention is devoted to cost-based analysis, the RBV of the firm focuses on a value-
enhancing dimension to identify a proper governance mode for certain economic activities. In 
other words, the RBV of the firm discusses resources allocated between internal and external 
governance modes based on their effectiveness in improving the sustainable competitive 
advantage of the firm (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). The term sustainable competitive advantage 
refers to an above-normal rent that a firm attains on a long-term basis. According to the RBV of 
the firm, a sustainable competitive advantage or superior performance is attained through 
generating valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable resources (VRIN) (Barney, 1991). 
Valuable and rare resources allow firms to satisfy customers’ requirements better (Peteraf, 1993). 
These valuable and rare resources should also be inimitable and non-substitutable, because 
competitors should not be able to replicate the firm’s competitive strategy or attain a similar 
performance based on other resources (Peteraf, 1993). Therefore, the RBV of the firm suggests 
that companies should use an isolating mechanism (an internal governance mode) for economic 
activities that determine their competitive advantages and to outsource those activities that are 
strategically less important to them (Wang et al., 2009; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). This is 
particularly true in the case of R&D activities, because protecting strategically important 
knowledge from imitation can be difficult when it is revealed to or generated by external actors 
(Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Mudambi and Tallman, 2010).  
 
There are several reasons that make outsourcing strategically important R&D activities a risky 
business. First, knowledge acquired from an R&D supplier may not be unique, because 
competitors may have access to the expertise of the same R&D supplier (Grimpe and Kaiser, 
2010). For this reason, increasing the scale of R&D outsourcing may reduce the firm-specific 
resources and, as a result, deteriorate the competitive advantages of the firm. Second, given that 
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technological knowledge is partly tacit in nature, acquiring such knowledge from a partner firm 
without direct involvement in problem-solving activities or intensive interaction with the 
knowledge holder can be difficult or impossible (Narula, 2001). Therefore, firms should keep 
internally the R&D activities that determine their competitive advantages and outsource those 
R&D tasks that are strategically less important to them (Quinn, 2000). By doing so, firms can 
improve their innovation processes through concentrating on the R&D activities in which they 
possess superior capabilities or competencies.  
 
Additionally, R&D outsourcing may help firms to minimize the costs and risks of peripheral 
innovation activities (Quinn, 1999, 2000; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). As firms are considered to 
be heterogeneous in terms of their resources and they may carry out the same economic activities 
with different costs (Barney, 1991), R&D outsourcing may allow firms to acquire rather 
peripheral R&D services from specialized suppliers relatively more cheaply than they can 
perform the same activities internally. Given that in modern days technological change is 
intensive and product life cycles are considerably shortened, many firms face internal economic- 
and knowledge-related constraints to accomplishing all their R&D activities internally 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Keupp and Gassmann, 2009). Prior research suggests that the lack of 
adequate internal resources limits firms’ capability to execute an R&D project effectively and, 
hence, undermines their innovation performance (Blanchard et al., 2013). Internal innovation 
constraints may even discourage a firm from undertaking innovation activities (Hottenrott and 
Peters, 2012), because it is less likely that the firm will accomplish an R&D project successfully 
when the gap between its existing resources and those needed for the project implementation is 
large. Hence, R&D openness and collaboration with external entities can be required to 
complement the internal innovation activities with external resources and, as a result, to 
overcome the internal impediments to innovation. In fact, Keupp and Gassmann (2009) show 
that firms open up their R&D boundaries in response to internal barriers to innovation. To deal 
with internal innovation constraints effectively, firms may employ different forms of R&D 
openness depending on whether they face economic- or knowledge-related obstacles. Regarding 
R&D outsourcing, this strategy can be a promising instrument to minimize the costs and risks of 
innovation activities, but it might be inferior to acquiring skills and know-how from external 
actors because such knowledge transfer across organizations requires mutual learning and 
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intensive interaction between firms, which is less likely to be delivered by R&D outsourcing. As 
an external collaboration driven by cost- rather than skill-sharing objectives may involve fewer 
asset specificity problems and, in this sense, require less interaction between contractors, R&D 
outsourcing can be a more appropriate strategy for dealing with economic- rather than 
knowledge-related innovation constraints. Therefore, we consider economic-related innovation 
impediments to be the primary driving force for R&D outsourcing, whereas knowledge- and 
capability-seeking motives can be a secondary issue. Hence, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: Economic- rather than knowledge-related innovation constraints are more likely to 
induce firms to increase the scale of their R&D outsourcing. 
 
 
An alternative governance mode to organize R&D activities outside a company is innovation 
cooperation, which is defined as an intermediate or hybrid organizational form between internal 
and market governance modes (Williamson, 1991). In contrast to R&D outsourcing, innovation 
cooperation allows firms to retain some degree of control over transactions (Williamson, 1991; 
Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). In particular, innovation cooperation implies a joint effort of 
contract partners to implement certain R&D activities (Hagedoorn, 1993; Tether, 2002). For this 
reason, innovation cooperation compared with R&D outsourcing may allow firms to create more 
efficient transactions, to lower the uncertainty over monitoring knowledge transfer and to 
mitigate partners’ opportunistic behaviour through a reciprocal and repeated relationship with 
them (Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). The frequent interaction between employees coming from 
cooperative parties is likely to build a trust-based relationship and a mutual understanding 
practice between them that can help the firms to exchange tacit knowledge. In this sense, 
innovation cooperation can be a better option than R&D outsourcingto utilize the skills and 
know-how of external partners (Hamel, 1991; Narula, 2001; Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). This 
innovation strategy can also be an important instrument for firms to reduce the costs and risks of 
R&D projects (Hagedoorn, 1993; Sakakibara, 1997; Narula, 2001). As R&D activities often 
involve many components of fixed costs, innovation cooperation can help firms to share the 




Despite numerous advantages associated with innovation cooperation, this strategy may also turn 
out to be a risky and costly process. In particular, inter-firm intensive interaction, resource 
sharing and mutual learning can be risky in relation to the leakage of strategically important tacit 
knowledge and, as a result, the loss of technological competitiveness. Moreover, considerable 
managerial resources are required to coordinate innovation cooperation with external actors, 
which can also be a costly process. Therefore, firms may adopt a portfolio approach to cope with 
internal innovation impediments and to mitigate the negative side of R&D openness. In 
particular, firms may favour the use of the R&D outsourcing strategy to deal with economic-
related obstacles and to engage in innovation cooperation partnerships with the purpose of 
coping with knowledge-related constraints. Although a firm may pursue economic- and 
knowledge-related objectives simultaneously in innovation cooperation and these objectives do 
not exclude each other, knowledge-acquisition rather than cost-minimization motives are more 
likely to be given the attention when firms engage in innovation cooperation partnerships. Based 
on these arguments, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Knowledge- rather than economic-related innovation impediments induce firms to 




2.3 Data description  
2.3.1 Sample  
The empirical analysis is based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP)5 database. The MIP is 
the German part of the Community Innovation Survey, which is financed by the German Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research. The Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) has 
conducted the survey annually since 1993 and gathers data on German innovative firms. The 
data are collected by sending questionnaires by email, and the target respondents of the MIP are 
innovative firms with at least five employees. The survey methodology is mainly constructed 
                                                          




based on the OECD/Eurostat Oslo Manual on innovation statistics. The main objective of the 
survey is to explore the innovation activities of German firms. For this purpose, in each wave of 
the survey, firm managers are asked about the process of generating innovation. As a result, the 
database provides a broad variety of information on innovation activities, such as innovation 
cooperation, R&D outsourcing, product and process innovations, etc. The MIP also contains 
information on firms’ internal innovation impediments, the specific factors that companies 
consider to be an obstacle to innovation activities.  
 
Although MIP data have been collected every year since 1993, the questionnaires sent to the 
respondents differ each year. As we are interested in studying the effect of internal innovation 
impediments on the degree of R&D openness and the required information for this study is 
available in the 1997, 2001 and 2005 surveys of the MIP, we build a 3-year panel dataset. The 
sample is also restricted to firms representing manufacturing industries, which gives us 3-year 
balanced panel data with 996 observations.    
 
2.3.2 Dependent variable  
The first dependent variable of interest is the proportion of R&D carried out by external actors 
(R&D_OUT), which is measured as the expenses for outsourced R&D over the spending for 
total R&D (the sum of internal and outsourced R&D expenditures). This measure enables us to 
study the extent to which firms invest in R&D outsourcing instead of internal R&D. The second 
dependent variable (INNO_COOP) is the number of innovation cooperation partnerships. The 
survey lists six possible such partners: suppliers, customers, competitors, consulting firms, 
universities and research institutes. The respondents were asked to indicate whether they have 
cooperative agreements with the above-listed organizations. To measure R&D openness with 
regard to innovation cooperation, the variables are added up so that a firm receives zero when it 
has no innovation cooperation and six when it has collaboration agreements with all of the listed 
entities. Thus, firms with a high number of innovation cooperation partnerships are considered to 





2.3.3 Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables used in the econometric analysis are the firms’ internal innovation 
constraints. The respondents were asked to indicate whether they experience difficulties in 
innovation activities and, in the case of a positive answer, to identify the possible factors 
responsible for a problem. The survey lists several possible internal impediments that firms 
might face during innovation activities, such as high costs and risks of innovation activities, a 
lack of skilled personnel, a lack of market information, a lack of technical information and 
organizational rigidity. The variables are scaled between 0 (not relevant) and 3 (highly relevant). 
To identify groups of innovation constraints with similar information content, each of the 
variables is coded as binary values, 0 for 0–1 scales and 1 for 2–3 scales; then, we conduct a 
component factor analysis (see Table I). The component factor analysis suggests two main 
groups of innovation constraints. In the first group, economic risks and costs of innovation go 
handinhand, and we name the group ECONOMIC IMPEDIMENTS. Innovation obstacles such 
as organizational rigidity, a lack of suitable qualified personnel, a lack of technical information 
and a lack of market information are joined in the second group, and we consequently refer to it 
as KNOWLEDGE IMPEDIMENTS. 
 








Risks of innovation 
Costs of innovation 
Organizational rigidity 
Lack of technical information 
Lack of market information 















Blanks represent abs(loading) < 0.45. 
 
2.3.4 Control variables  
Several control variables are introduced into the econometric analysis to account for other 
specific factors that may induce firms to increase their openness in innovation. First of all, we 
control for R&D intensity6 (R&D_INTENSITY) measured as the expenditures on innovation-
                                                          
6The variable is expressed in percentages.  
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related activities divided by the firm’s sales7. As R&D-intensive firms may have a greater 
tendency to conduct exploratory research or to develop breakthrough innovations, these firms are 
more likely to be open to external collaborations (including both innovation cooperation and 
R&D outsourcing) to access knowledge outside their expertise. Investing intensively in R&D 
activities may also allow firms to develop internal expertise required for an effective external 
collaboration (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Grimpe and 
Kaiser, 2010). Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between R&D intensity and openness 
in innovation. Second, to account for whether a firm faces international competition, we 
introduce export intensity into the econometric analysis (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Grimpe 
and Kaiser, 2010). The variable is measured as the share of sales from exports 
(EXPORT_INTENSITY). As firms competing in global markets may often face rapid changes in 
technology and consumer preferences, they may engage in open innovation to cope with the 
increased risks and costs of R&D projects and to acquire the needed resources from external 
actors. 
Table II – Industry breakdown   





Food and beverages, tobacco  
Textiles, leather, footwear  














Rubber and plastic products  
Machinery and equipment 






Coke, refined petroleum, chemical industry 
Electrical apparatus, computing machines, communication equipment 




Industries are classified according to the OECD (2003) manual. Manufacturing sectors related to natural resources 
such as mining and construction are excluded.  
 
Besides, to control for unobservable firm and industry characteristics that may influence the 
organizational decision to adopt open innovation principles, we include firm size and industry 
dummies in the econometric models. Firm size (LOG_SIZE) is measured as the number of 
                                                          
7Total innovation expenditures are scaled by sales to avoid the firm size effect in R&D spending.  
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employees in logarithmic values. Given that large-sized firms often act as an assembler rather 
than a producer, they may outsource more R&D activities than small-sized firms (Mol, 2005). A 
positive relationship is also expected between firm size and innovation cooperation partnerships, 
because smaller firms may lack adequate resources to collaborate with a wide set of external 
actors. With regard to industry dummies, four manufacturing industry groups are introduced 
based on the OECD classification – low-technology manufacturing industries, medium-low-
technology manufacturing industries, medium-high-technology manufacturing industries, and 
high-technology manufacturing industries (see Table II) – for which the benchmark variable is 
low-technology manufacturing industries. 
 
2.4 Econometric methods 
The first dependent variable used in the empirical analysis is R&D_OUT, which has zero and 
one values as well as intermediate outcomes. The variable is also right-skewed, containing a high 
number of zeros. One way to handle these specific features of the data is to use the generalized 
estimating equation (GEE) model, which enables us to estimate the parameters of a generalized 
linear model in panel data (Liang and Zeger, 1986). In particular, GEE allows us to relate a 
response variable that follows a non-normal distribution to a predictor variable in a linear term 
via a proper family distribution and link function. Given that the dependent variable of interest is 
the share of R&D outsourcing in the total R&D expenditures (the sum of internal and outsourced 
R&D spending), we use a binomial family distribution and a logit link function, which are 
usually employed to model a dependent variable with proportional or fractional values (Papke 
and Wooldridge, 1996; Baum, 2008). The GEE also allows us to control for the possible serial 
correlation in the model (Liang and Zeger, 1986; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). For diagnostic 
purposes, we also estimate a right-censored random-effect tobit model, which adequately 
accounts for these specific features of our data by treating firms with and without R&D 
outsourcing differently (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). An alternative fixed-effect tobit model is 
inconsistent with short panel data (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). 
 
The second dependent variable of interest (INNO_COOP) has non-negative count outcomes, 
ranging from zero to six. Usually, the starting point of a count data analysis is a Poisson model 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, 2009), which is used to model count data when an equal-dispersion 
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property is satisfied, implying that the variance and mean are equal in a dependent variable. In 
our case, a regression-based over-dispersion test provides a significant coefficient, rejecting the 
equal-dispersion assumption (see model 3 in Table V). Over-dispersion is problematic, because it 
‘leads to grossly deflated standard errors and grossly inflated t statistics’ (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005: 670). The standard method for dealing with the over-dispersion problem is a negative 
binomial model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, 2009). Accordingly, we use the random-effect 
negative binomial model to model adequately the count data with the over-dispersion problem 
and repeated observations. To ensure that the results obtained from the random-effect negative 
binomial model are reliable, we also employ other econometric models. Taking into 
consideration that INNO_COOP has count outcomes and it is also right-skewed, we estimate the 
GEE model with the negative binomial family distribution8 and log link function. For diagnostic 
purposes, we also estimate the right-censored random-effect tobit model (Keupp and Gassmann, 
2009). 
 
Table III – Descriptive statistics 
Variable names Type Obs. Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min Max 
R&D_OUT Share 996 0.0460 0.1480 0 1 
INNO_COOP  Count 996 0.4919 1.1652 0 6 
ECONOMIC IMPEDIMENTS Count 996 0.8242 0.9276 0 2 
KNOWLEDGE IMPEDIMENTS Count 996 0.7479 1.1543 0 4 
R&D_INTENSITY  continuous 996 1.1451 4.2939 0 55.803 
EXPORT_INTENSITY Share 996 0.0518 0.1437 0 0.9333 
LOG_SIZE  continuous 996 4.4728 1.6143 0.6931 11.173 
MEDIUM-LOW-TECH INDUSTRY Binary 996 0.3433 0.4750 0 1 
MEDIUM-HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY  Binary 996 0.2730 0.4457 0 1 
HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY Binary 996 0.1475 0.3548 0 1 
 
 
2.5 Estimation results 
Table V contains the estimates from the empirical analysis. Models 1 and 2 are devoted to R&D 
outsourcing and models 3 to 5 to innovation cooperation. Regarding the core explanatory 
                                                          
8 We compare the GEE models with negative binomial and Poisson family distributions with each other. The former 
model presents a lower value of the Akaike Information Criterion. Therefore, the GEE model with negative 




variables, ECONOMIC IMPEDIMENTS and KNOWLEDGE IMPEDIMENTS, the econometric 
models present similar outcomes for R&D_OUT as for INNO_COOP.  
Table IV – Correlation table  
  Variable names 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 R&D_OUT 1.000                   
2 INNO_COOP  0.257*** 1.000                 
3 ECONOMIC IMPEDIMENTS 0.065** 0.094*** 1.000              
4 KNOWLEDGE IMPEDIMENTS 0.116*** 0.133*** 0.504*** 1.000             
5 R&D_INTENSITY  0.043*** 0.139*** -0.080** -0.030 1.000           
6 EXPORT_INTENSITY 0.046 0.112*** -0.157*** -0.103*** 0.312*** 1.000         
7 LOG_SIZE  0.106*** 0.397*** 0.009 0.085*** -0.001 0.157*** 1.000       
8 MEDIUM-LOW-TECH INDUSTRY -0.022 -0.114*** 0.048 -0.005 -0.034 -0.045 -0.091*** 1.000     
9 MEDIUM-HIGH-TECH 
INDUSTRY  
0.086*** 0.130*** -0.039 -0.001 0.003 0.111*** 0.093*** -0.443*** 1.000   
10 HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY 0.014** 0.103*** 0.054 0.012 0.111*** 0.010 0.019 -0.301*** -0.255*** 1.000 
Note:  ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Looking first at the control variables, the econometric analysis identifies a significant positive 
relationship between R&D intensity (R&D_INTENSITY) and R&D openness (including both 
R&D_OUT and INNO_COOP). Given that firms’ R&D activities significantly and positively 
contribute to their absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990), those companies that 
invest intensively in R&D processes develop a large absorptive capacity and, in this sense, they 
are more likely to manage R&D collaboration with a wide set of external entities than others 
with fewer R&D competencies.  
Moreover, we find a significant positive relationship between LOG_SIZE and R&D_OUT as 
well as between LOG_SIZE and INNO_COOP. Compared with small-sized firms, large 
companies usually own better internal research capabilities (i.e. financial, physical and human 
resources) that enable them to adopt the open innovation framework. Furthermore, as large firms 
often act as an assembler rather than a producer, they intensively outsource their R&D activities 
and cooperate with a wide set of external actors in innovation to acquire the needed R&D inputs. 
In other words, large companies often carry out a system integrator task, combining externally 
available technological knowledge but developing only a small part of the sub-technologies 





Table V – Estimation results for R&D outsourcing and innovation cooperation 
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Note:   ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
The data analysis also suggests that those firms belonging to medium-high- and high-technology 
manufacturing industries are more likely to outsource their R&D activities and also to engage in 
innovation cooperation partnerships than their counterparts operating in low- and medium-low-
technology manufacturing sectors. This inter-industry difference with regard to open innovation 
adoption might be related to the fact that medium-high- and high-technology sectors are on 
average more technology-intensive comparing with low- and medium-low-technology industries. 
Therefore, medium-high- and high-technology manufacturing firms engage in open innovation 
practices to accelerate innovation processes and to cope with rapid changes in the external 
environment.       
Besides, export intensity (EXPORT_INTENSITY) provides a significant coefficient neither for 
R&D_OUT nor for INNO_COOP. It is surprising that export-oriented firms show no inclination 
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towards the open innovation approach, because these firms are subject to global competitive 
pressure and R&D openness might be relevant to them to accelerate their innovation activities, to 
share the risks-costs of R&D projects with external actors and to acquire needed resources from 
them to perform successfully in international markets. However, an alternative line of reasoning 
may suggest that increased global competition can also be an obstacle to a high degree of R&D 
openness in terms of driving the unpredictability of the market demand and increasing the pace 
of technological changes. Under such conditions, renegotiation or cancellation of R&D contracts 
might be required and, as a result, it can be costly to organize R&D activities outside the 
company. Hence, the non-significant correlation between export intensity and formal R&D 
openness might be driven by the ambiguous relationship between the international competition 
and the boundaries of the firm.  
Looking now at hypothesis H1, we find no support for economic related impediments being 
more relevant to R&D outsourcing than knowledge-related obstacles. In models 1 and 2 of Table 
V, the respective coefficients for ECONOMIC IMPEDIMENTS are statistically not significant. 
In addition, the data show a non-significant relationship between ECONOMIC IMPEDIMENTS 
and the breadth of innovation cooperation (INNO_COOP). In view of our hypothesis H2, we 
expected economic-related impediments to be not or less relevant than knowledge-related 
constraints to innovation cooperation. This general insignificance of economic-related barriers 
might be partly due to the fact that increasing openness with regard to R&D outsourcing and 
innovation cooperation may involve considerable risks and costs in terms of coordinating 
external collaborations and utilizing knowledge from a wide set of external actors. For these 
reasons, firms with cost-risk minimization objectives may avoid increasing their degree of 
openness in innovation.  
Regarding knowledge-related obstacles (KNOWLEDGE IMPEDIMENT), the variable has a 
significant and positive sign in all the regression models for innovation cooperation 
(INNO_COOP) and for R&D outsourcing (R&D_OUT). The econometric analysis suggests that 
firms lacking internal expertise to innovate increase the breadth of their innovation cooperation 
partnerships as well as the scale of their R&D outsourcing. This firstly supports our prediction in 
hypothesis H2; we find evidence that knowledge- rather than economic-related innovation 
impediments induce firms to engage more broadly in innovation cooperation. Secondly, it turns 
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our hypothesis H1 on R&D outsourcing upside down; it is quite surprising that knowledge-
related innovation constraints are the primary driving force for outsourcing R&D activities. 
However, prior research also suggests that firms have shifted their attention from a cost-oriented 
framework towards a value-enhancing consideration in the decision to outsource R&D activities 




During the last few decades, increased global competition and fast changes in the market 
environment have forced firms to alter the way in which they organize their innovation activities 
(Chesbrough, 2003). In particular, companies have shifted their innovation activities from an 
internal-R&D-oriented approach towards an open innovation framework to accelerate and 
improve their innovation activities. Given that the fast pace of technological changes and 
shortened product life cycles increase the risks and costs of innovation activities, many firms 
lack adequate internal resources to carry out all their R&D activities internally (Chesbrough, 
2003; Keupp and Gassmann, 2009). Valuable knowledge is also spread across different 
specialized research organizations and external collaboration can be required to supplement 
internal innovation activities with relevant external resources. For these reasons, companies 
adopt the open innovation approach to overcome internal innovation obstacles (Keupp and 
Gassmann, 2009). Based on that, an interesting question arises about how firms design their 
R&D boundaries in response to internal innovation constraints. More concretely, little is known 
about whether firms with economic- and knowledge-related obstacles increase their degree of 
openness towards R&D outsourcing or innovation cooperation. To study this issue, we analyse a 
three-year panel dataset of German manufacturing firms obtained from the MIP database. The 
results obtained from the econometric analysis suggest that cost–risk minimization objectives do 
not significantly affect the organizational decision to increase the openness in innovation. This 
may be because open innovation itself entails considerable costs and risks in terms of searching 
for and utilizing knowledge from a wide set of external actors. In other words, a high degree of 
R&D openness puts an additional burden on a firm in terms of dynamically increasing the costs 




Another result of the empirical analysis shows that knowledge-related obstacles induce firms to 
increase the scale of R&D outsourcing as well as to engage more broadly in innovation 
cooperation. It is surprising that knowledge- rather than economic-related impediments are the 
primary reason behind R&D outsourcing. This strategy can assist firms to acquire external 
knowledge-based resources, but there is no guarantee that increasing the degree of openness with 
regard to R&D outsourcing can help firms to improve their innovation performance. On the 
contrary, prior research highlights the potential drawbacks of large-scale R&D outsourcing, 
because sourcing knowledge-based resources from external actors via an arm’s length contract 
may reduce the tacit knowledge application and learning-by-doing processes in internal research; 
as a result, it may hamper the innovation performance of the firm (Bettis et al., 1992; Weigelt, 
2009). However, companies may combine different forms of openness in innovation to facilitate 
knowledge utilization from external entities and to boost their innovation activities.  
 
In summary, our findings suggest that firms devote more attention to growth objectives (in terms 
of accessing external knowledge) than to defensive motives (in terms of minimizing the costs and 
risks of innovation activities) in the decision to adopt the open innovation framework. In this 
context, R&D openness may complement rather than substitute internal innovation activities. 
Given that effective knowledge utilization from external entities requires substantial internal 
expertise, firms need strong internal research capabilities to benefit from the open innovation 
approach. Hence, the degree of openness in innovation should be in balance with the internal 










In a world of abundant access to external knowledge, the question of how firms should organize 
their R&D and innovation activities, taking into account the potential benefits of opening up the 
innovation processes, once again becomes high on the managerial agenda. In particular, the 
opportunities to utilize inter-organizational relationships, alliances, external R&D contractors 
and consultants open up a wide array of organizing opportunities for a firm’s innovation 
activities, but also questions whether these activities are complementary (Schmiedeberg, 2008) 
and hence beneficial. The open innovation concept coined by Chesbrough (2003) has been 
studied intensely in recent years (for reviews see e.g. Enkel et al., 2009; Dahlander and Gann, 
2010; Gassman et al., 2010) and especially research on the structural aspects focusing on the use 
and performance implications of alliances and partnerships has been conducted heavily (Fey and 
Birkinshaw, 2005; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Henttonen et al., 2011; Inauen and Schenker-Wicki, 
2011; Knudsen and Mortensen, 2011; Henttonen and Ritala, 2013). Thus far, however, only a 
little attention has been paid to the challenges of identifying the best organization of these 
processes for the firm when taking into account both internal and external opportunities for 
innovation.  
 
Enkel et al. (2009: 312–313) coins three organizing processes: outside-in, inside-out and the 
coupled process. The outside-in processes are typically associated with the utilization of external 
partnerships like alliances, whereas the coupled processes ‘combine the outside-in process (to 
gain external knowledge) with the inside-out process (to bring ideas to market) and, in doing so, 
jointly develop and commercialize innovation’ (Enkel et al., 2009: 313). Within the outside-in 
processes, a number of opportunities are available as sources of knowledge for the innovation 
process. The literature differentiates between two general outside-in strategies: the acquisition of 
external R&D through licenses or contracts with R&D suppliers and the joint development of 
innovation with cooperation partners. The former strategy implies the acquisition of a research 
outcome from external contracting partners, whereas the latter strategy refers to a joint effort of 
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the partner firms to develop valuable (knowledge) assets that they may not have been able or 
willing to develop alone through internal R&D. However, these organizing processes neglect the 
linkage between the ongoing activities within the firm, that is, internal R&D and the external 
organizational opportunities. Recent research focuses on the potential complementarities 
between internal R&D and external organizing processes like the utilization of partnerships in 
cooperation or the acquisition of R&D from contractors (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; 
Schmiedeberg, 2008). Complementarities exist when ‘the implementation of one activity pays 
off more if the complementary activity is present, too. Thus, internal and external R&D being 
complements means that the performance of externally sourced R&D is higher if the firm 
conducts internal R&D at the same time and vice versa’ (Schmiedeberg, 2008: 1493). Hence, 
when firms organize their activities, they simultaneously consider the advantages of utilizing 
internal sources of R&D compared with external sources and how these may be combined to 
achieve the best possible outcome. Schmiedeberg (2008) highlights the difficulties in 
establishing unambiguous empirical results, although the literature clearly argues in favour of 
complementarities. This paper therefore follows up on the research on complementarities to 
analyse the organization of innovation decisions of manufacturing firms by examining the 
following research questions: 
 
Do domestic and international external R&D complement or substitute internal R&D 
and innovation cooperation? 
How do domestic and international external R&D relate to innovation performance? 
 
By analysing these questions, this paper contributes to the literature on innovation management 
and to the literature on the organization of innovation activities in three ways. First, although 
previous studies discuss a complementary relationship between external R&D and other 
innovation strategies (i.e. internal R&D and innovation cooperation) (Cassiman and Veugelers, 
2006; Lokshin et al., 2008; Schmiedeberg, 2008; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010), the geographical 
dimension of external R&D has thus far not been studied. In other words, firms that acquire 
international, rather than domestic, external R&D may have a greater tendency to invest in 
internal R&D as well as to engage in innovation cooperation partnerships, because the utilization 
of external knowledge stemming from international R&D suppliers may require an advanced 
49 
 
level of internal capability (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; Bertrand and Mol, 2013) and 
absorptive capacity. 
 
Secondly, it is not clear whether firms that acquire international external R&D are more likely to 
generate product innovations with a higher degree of novelty than others that purchase external 
R&D from the domestic market. This paper therefore contributes to the literature by introducing 
the geographic dimension of the location of the external contractors into the understanding of 
complementarities in the organization of innovation activities. In particular, the differentiation 
between domestic and international R&D seems promising as it may be expected that the 
adoption of knowledge from external sources with larger geographical and cultural distance is 
more difficult than domestic and close-by relationships. 
 
The third contribution concerns the empirical methodology. Rather than using standard yes or no 
questions to identify the use of such strategies, this paper uses the amount of money invested in 
these activities as a proxy. This allows us to investigate the inter-relationships between different 
innovation strategies and product innovation in detail. 
 
The empirical results from the analyses in this paper are ambiguous as those firms acquiring 
external R&D from international marketplaces invest simultaneously in internal R&D and 
engage in a high number of innovation cooperation partnerships, but joint representation of these 
instruments shows a significant negative relationship with product innovation. Furthermore, the 
results show no significant complementary or substitutive relationship between domestic external 
R&D and internal R&D as well as between domestic external R&D and innovation cooperation. 
Moreover, the analysis indicates that those firms acquiring international, rather than domestic, 
external R&D are more likely to develop product innovation with a higher degree of novelty, 
implying that those firms sourcing knowledge from international R&D suppliers tap into the 
global knowledge pool and, in this way, improve their innovation performance compared with 
others that rely only on domestic external R&D. These results are discussed and the implications 




3.2 Literature review and hypothesis development  
 
The organization of external knowledge sourcing in the form of external R&D on the one hand 
and innovation cooperation on the other and the combination with internal R&D have come to be 
important managerial decisions, especially in the light of the focus on the increased opening of 
innovation processes (Chesbrough, 2003; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Berchicci, 2013; Clausen, 
2013). Hence, firms may organize their activities with increasing degrees of openness by 
establishing innovation cooperation and buy external R&D to source relevant external 
knowledge resources and to increase the speed or quality of innovation activities faster and at a 
lower cost (Chesbrough, 2003; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Berchicci, 2013). 
 
3.2.1 Organization of R&D activities 
Chesbrough (2003) argues that the increased global competition and the fast pace of 
technological change have eroded the effectiveness of vertically integrated R&D organization. A 
vertically integrated research function implies that a firm has full control over its value chain (it 
owns its suppliers and customers) and all of the economic activities are organized within the 
formal boundaries of the firm. This, on the one hand, allows firms to reduce their transaction 
costs and to coordinate their economic activities efficiently (Williamson, 1975), but on the other 
hand, vertical integration can be risky under market and technological uncertainties 
(Chesbrough, 2003), because technological changes may be competence-destroying for 
incumbent firms and their suppliers (Afuah, 2001). As an alternative, a firm may reorganize its 
activities by sourcing the required resources and knowledge to increase the firm’s strategic 
flexibility and to switch knowledge suppliers adaptively when new competence-destroying 
technologies emerge on the market (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Chesbrough, 2003). Hence, the 
open innovation framework offers an alternative strategic direction for firms to cope with the 
rapidly changing market environment as the organizing opportunities enable the company to 
accelerate innovation through exploring combinations of internal and external knowledge 
sources (Chesbrough, 2003; Laursen and Salter, 2006).  
 
External R&D implies that firms enhance and fertilize their innovation activities by acquiring 
knowledge and technologies from R&D service firms. Ideally, knowledge-based activities that 
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give firms competitive advantages over their competitors should be organized internally and 
R&D activities that are less important for long-term competitiveness should be contracted out to 
external specialized suppliers (Quinn, 1999, 2000). In this way, companies can reduce the costs 
and risks of non-core R&D activities in which they lack competencies. Moreover, this division of 
R&D tasks enables firms to improve their efficiency and effectiveness in innovation through 
concentrating on the activities in which they have already accumulated competencies and 
experience. 
 
Several reasons why the use of external R&D improves firms’ innovation performance (Quinn, 
1999, 2000; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Grimpe and Kaiser, 
2010) can be put forward. First, it enables companies to overcome internal innovation 
constraints, such as a lack of suitable qualified personnel, a lack of technical expertise and the 
high costs and risks of R&D projects (Quinn, 1999, 2000; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). Second, 
external R&D may allow firms to access better-quality resources than they can generate 
internally (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). This is the case when a firm lacks expertise in certain 
innovation activities whereas an R&D supplier is specialized in just these activities. Third, 
external R&D may help firms to access complementary or heterogeneous knowledge assets 
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010), which are considered to be the 
primary source of innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). For this 
reason, firms diversify their external knowledge sources and search for complementary resources 
within their home country as well as beyond the national borders (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 
2002; von Zedtwitz et al., 2004; Lewin et al., 2009; Bertrand and Mol, 2013). 
 
An external R&D strategy may also involve certain risks, because protecting strategic knowledge 
from imitation can be difficult when it is generated by external actors. Knowledge that is non-
excludable could spill over from an R&D supplier to multiple client firms (Grimpe and Kaiser, 
2010). Additional reasons that increase the risk of using external R&D in innovation activities 
may be listed. First, knowledge acquired from an R&D supplier may not be unique, because 
competitors may have access to the expertise of the same R&D supplier. Second, external R&D 
may reduce firm-specific competencies, because this strategy implies the acquisition of a 
research outcome from external suppliers without participating in problem-solving activities. For 
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this reason, external R&D can hamper a client firm’s innovation capabilities. Complete reliance 
on external R&D in innovation activities is not likely, because the utilization of knowledge 
sourced from R&D suppliers requires substantial expertise and competencies in the client firm.  
 
An alternative external governance mode for R&D activities is innovation cooperation. In 
contrast to external R&D, innovation cooperation allows firms to keep some degree of control 
over business processes performed jointly by the contract partners in general (Williamson, 1991) 
and over the knowledge-generating processes in particular. The literature defines cooperation as 
a hybrid organizational form (between market and internal governance) whereby firms commit 
their resources to a common project and interact intensively to induce and benefit from learning 
processes (Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). The frequent interaction between the employees 
coming from the partner firms is likely to build the trust-based relationships between them 
(Powell, 1990) that are required to share unwritten knowledge such as skills and know-how 
(Holste and Fields, 2010). For these reasons, innovation cooperation may enable firms to create 
more efficient transactions for monitoring the behaviour of the contract partners and transferring 
as well as exchanging knowledge (Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). Furthermore, innovation 
cooperation allows firms to reduce the costs and risks of R&D projects as well as to speed up 
new product development through pooling complementary resources (Hagedoorn, 1993). 
 
The main advantage of external R&D compared with innovation cooperation is that it allows 
firms to acquire ready R&D results; once the activities have been performed, the outcome is 
subsequently transferred back and used in internal R&D. In this context, external R&D allows 
firms to contract out rather peripheral innovation activities to external actors and to concentrate 
internally on the core innovation activities that determine their competitive advantages (Quinn, 
1999, 2000). In doing so, companies move their innovation activities from sequential to parallel 
working processes (Howells et al., 2003; Langlois, 2003). In other words, a firm distributes its 
R&D tasks among different external actors in which separated R&D activities are implemented 
independently and simultaneously. The benefit of this approach is that external R&D enables 
companies to speed up the new product development as well as to reduce the costs and risks of 
peripheral innovation activities in which they lack competencies (Quinn, 1999, 2000). However, 
openness in innovation in the form of external R&D may also turn out to be costly (Cohen and 
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Levinthal, 1990); ‘costly’ means not only in terms of coordinating and enforcing external 
contracts, but also in terms of interpreting and utilizing external knowledge. As Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) suggest, a firm needs absorptive capacity to be able to identify, assimilate and 
transform external knowledge for internal purposes. Absorptive capacity, which refers to a firm’s 
prior related knowledge, enables the company to acquire new knowledge in the particular field in 
which it has already accumulated a certain level of expertise. Building up absorptive capacity 
requires direct involvement in innovation and problem-solving activities, practice and 
experience-based learning. For these reasons, shifting the attention from internal innovation 
activities towards the exploitation of external knowledge can hamper firms’ absorptive capacity 
and, as a result, their innovation performance. This issue is more critical in the case of external 
R&D than in the case of innovation cooperation (Mudambi and Tallman, 2010), because in the 
case of external R&D the client firm is not involved in problem-solving activities. This, on the 
one hand, allows the firm to specialize in a narrow set of core innovation activities and to 
contract out rather peripheral R&D tasks to external actors. However, on the other hand, to use 
the externally provided results requires substantial expertise from the firm to evaluate and utilize 
the external R&D (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). For this reason, this innovation strategy may not 
be independent from internal R&D. In other words, internal R&D is considered to be a 
prerequisite for developing absorptive capacity and, hence, utilizing knowledge sourced from 
R&D service firms. Indeed, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) find a complementary relationship 
between external and internal R&D in product innovation. In other words, the authors provide 
empirical evidence that the marginal returns of external R&D in product innovation increase if 
firms simultaneously invest in internal R&D. 
 
These considerations of complementarity can also be extended to innovation cooperation. For 
instance, Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) provide empirical evidence that not only internal R&D but 
also a high number of innovation cooperation partnerships positively moderate the effect of 
external R&D on product innovation. There are two reasons for the complementary relationship 
between external R&D and innovation cooperation. First, implementing innovation activities 
together with external actors allows firms to enlarge their internal expertise and knowledge 
stock. By knowing more, firms can manage the utilization of external R&D effectively (Brusoni 
et al., 2001). Second, coordinating a high number of innovation cooperation partnerships enables 
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firms to develop external collaboration skills and capabilities, which can be essential to avoid 
errors in selecting specialized research organizations for certain innovation activities and then to 
transfer knowledge from them effectively (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). In other words, as 
innovation cooperation with a wide set of external actors allows firms to enrich their internal 
stock of knowledge and also to specialize in the management of external partnerships, firms that 
engage in innovation cooperation partnerships are more likely to manage the knowledge transfer 
from R&D suppliers effectively than others that are less experienced in innovation cooperation. 
Hence, prior research suggests that firms adopt different R&D strategies in open innovation to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their innovation activities.   
 
3.2.2 International external knowledge sourcing as part of innovation activities  
Open innovation does not stop at national borders, although the issue has only been addressed 
very briefly (Gassmann et al., 2010). Due to the cost reductions in communication technologies, 
increased internationalization of R&D activities has developed, which enables companies to 
access cheap R&D inputs from low-cost countries and to access valuable knowledge abroad (von 
Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; von Zedtwitz et al., 2004; Lewin et al., 2009). If a firm does not 
manage to identify appropriate knowledge partners in its own country, it may organize R&D on a 
global scale to diversify its external knowledge sources and to access resources that are 
unavailable within its home country (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; von Zedtwitz et al., 
2004; Lewin et al., 2009; Nieto and Rodriguez, 2011). Given that scientific expertise is 
distributed worldwide, innovation cooperation with international actors or the acquisition of 
external R&D from them can be essential to keep pace in various fields of technological 
development (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; von Zedtwitz et al., 2004; Lewin et al., 2009). 
In other words, firms outsource some R&D tasks outside their home country because 
international R&D suppliers may possess superior technological expertise to domestic providers 
(Lewin et al., 2009; Nieto and Rodriguez, 2011). For example, Lewin et al. (2009) find that the 
limited resources and shortages of highly skilled workers within the home market induce firms to 
outsource some R&D activities outside the national borders. Other motives for the 
internationalization of R&D activities include acquiring cheap R&D inputs from low-cost 
countries and exploring the requirements of foreign markets (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; 
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von Zedtwitz et al., 2004). The internationalization of R&D activities allows firms to have direct 
access to customers abroad, to align their needs with new product development and to meet the 
requirements of various foreign markets. In this way, companies seek to exploit their resources in 
an international market.  
 
Distinguishing external R&D based on a geographical dimension, knowledge transfer from 
international, rather than from domestic, R&D suppliers might be more problematic (von 
Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; Bertrand and Mol, 2013). Even though the development of 
information technologies has decreased the obstacles to long-distance communication, tacit 
knowledge is considered to be geographically bounded (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; 
Morgan, 2004). Learning tacit knowledge requires intensive informal and face-to-face 
communications, which are often problematic to perform between remote locations. Besides, 
different national innovation systems, cultures and institutions across countries create a 
heterogeneous learning environment for local and foreign firms (Freeman, 1995). As a result, the 
levels of understanding between them can be limited due to their diverse routines and knowledge 
bases.  
 
Firms that have a large absorptive capacity and prior related knowledge may safeguard against 
these problems of limited understanding and tacitness of knowledge. According to Prencipe 
(1997, 2000), the technological knowledge overlap between client and supplier firms facilitates 
the effective utilization of external R&D. In this sense, increasing the common understanding in 
technological knowledge between partner firms may help them to overcome the geographical 
distance in knowledge exchange. Based on that, firms need to engage in internal R&D activities 
to build up appropriate absorptive capacities and to ease knowledge sourcing from international 
marketplaces. Hence, firms that are more intensely engaged in international, rather than 
domestic, external R&D may invest more in internal R&D.  
 
Another way to bridge geographical distance is to engage in international innovation 
cooperation, which generally increases the common understanding and overcomes frictions due 
to different innovation cultures; as a consequence, the utilization of external R&D from remote 




H1a: Firms that acquire international, rather than domestic, external R&D are more likely to 
invest in internal R&D. 
 
H1b: Firms that acquire international, rather than domestic, external R&D are more likely to 
engage in international innovation cooperation partnerships. 
 
 
3.2.3 International knowledge sourcing and innovation performance 
Previous studies have shown that internal R&D as well as innovation cooperation are important 
drivers of product innovation (Deeds and Hill, 1996; Becker and Dietz, 2004; Nieto and 
Santamaria, 2007; Vega-Jurado et al., 2008), whereas the contribution from external R&D is not 
clear. Firms organize strategically important R&D activities internally to generate valuable and 
competitive resources and to protect these resources from imitation by competitors. In other 
words, internal R&D allows companies to develop and accumulate firm-specific competencies, 
which determine their innovation capabilities. To cope with the increased complexity of 
innovation, firms also collaborate with external actors to access resources that cannot be 
generated internally (Powell et al., 1996). This allows companies to develop valuable 
(knowledge) assets through a joint effort of the partner firms (Hagedoorn, 1993). This strategy is 
characterized by intensive interaction, resource sharing and mutual learning, which help firms to 
enhance their innovation activities (Hagedoorn, 1993; Powell et al., 1996; Becker and Dietz, 
2004; Belderbos et al., 2004; Nieto and Santamaria, 2007).  
 
On the contrary, external R&D does not imply mutual learning or intensive interaction in a 
knowledge-creation process. Instead, a client firm purchases research results from R&D 
suppliers without being involved in the knowledge generation of external R&D. The uniqueness 
of research results acquired from an R&D supplier is also questionable, because competitors may 
have access to the expertise of the same R&D supplier (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). In the long 
run, relying heavily on external R&D may even exhaust firms’ innovation potential through 
reducing skilled employees and problem-solving activities in internal R&D (Bettis et al., 1992; 
Weigelt, 2009). Based on that, the question arises of how and to what extent external R&D 




Drawing on our discussion above, given that the utilization of external knowledge requires 
absorptive capacity, it is unlikely that firms rely entirely on external R&D for their innovation 
activities. They complement it with internal innovation activities whereby the gains to be reaped 
from external R&D depend on the effective integration of external knowledge into internal 
innovation activities (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010).  
 
Prior studies provide empirical evidence that the marginal returns of external R&D in product 
innovation increase if firms simultaneously invest in internal R&D and vice versa, external R&D 
enhances internal innovation activities (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Grimpe and Kaiser, 
2010).  
 
In view of the internationalization of knowledge sourcing, one may ask whether there is a 
difference in domestic external R&D and international external R&D. Despite the fact that the 
coordination of international R&D relates to high transaction costs, firms organize R&D on a 
global scale to access resources that are unavailable within the domestic market. In this sense, 
companies outsource some R&D activities outside the national borders to cope with the limited 
resources and shortages of highly skilled workers within their home market (Lewin et al., 2009). 
Moreover, the knowledge-based assets sourced from international marketplaces might be more 
heterogeneous than those within the home country due to the different institutions and national 
innovation systems (Freeman, 1995). In this sense, international, rather than domestic, external 
R&D can help firms to access more diverse knowledge inputs. Hence, the higher transaction 
costs appear to go hand in hand with a higher value of the externally addressed knowledge 
accessed. Looking at the empirical evidence, firms with external R&D from international 
marketplaces can have more opportunities for knowledge recombination and perform better in 
innovation than others relying only on domestic resources (Bertrand and Mol, 2013). Based on 
that, we want to check the first hypothesis on international external R&D:  
 
H2a: Firms that acquire international, rather than domestic, external R&D are more likely to 




Connecting this to our discussion of the complementarity of different innovation-oriented 
governance modes above, we emphasize even more that firms should also possess strong 
integrative or absorptive capacity to gain from international external R&D. Therefore, firms that 
purchase international, rather than domestic, external R&D are more likely to introduce product 
innovation with a higher degree of novelty if they simultaneously invest in internal R&D and 
engage in international innovation cooperation for the purpose of developing knowledge-
integrative capabilities. Hence, we propose the following two additional hypotheses on 
international external R&D:  
 
H2b: Firms that acquire international, rather than domestic, external R&D are more likely to 
introduce product innovations with a higher degree of novelty if they simultaneously invest 
in internal R&D.  
H2c: Firms that acquire international, rather than domestic, external R&D are more likely to 
introduce product innovations with a higher degree of novelty if they simultaneously 
engage in international innovation cooperation partnerships. 
 
3.3 Data description  
The empirical analysis of the paper is based on the Danish part of the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS).9 The CIS is conducted at the enterprise level, and it gives a broad variety of 
information on innovation activities such as internal R&D, domestic and international external 
R&D, innovation cooperation and different types of product innovations. To avoid cross-
sectional data-related problems in the empirical analysis, we impose a timelag between 
innovation input and output variables. As the literature suggests (Griliches and Mairesse, 1984; 
Pakes and Schankerman, 1984), time is required to finalize an R&D project, to introduce a new 
product to a market and then to obtain revenues from the new product sales. Although the 
timelag may vary across firms and depend on the type of R&D projects that they run, an average 
lag between innovation input and innovation output is about two years (Griliches and Mairesse, 
1984; Pakes and Schankerman, 1984). Therefore, we combine the 2008 and 2010 CIS datasets, 
implying that innovation strategies and other control variables come from the 2008 CIS, whereas 
                                                          
9The paper acknowledges the access to the Danish CIS data from the Danish Statistical Office. 
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the innovation output (i.e. turnovers from product innovation) is taken from the 2010 CIS (see 
Table VI). In the original 2008 and 2010 CIS datasets, there were 939 and 1111 firms, 
respectively. After combining these two datasets and restricting the sample to manufacturing 
firms in line with prior studies (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Schmiedeberg, 2008), we obtain 
491 observations.  
Table VI – Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Step CIS survey – year 





The expenses for R&D performed by external actors 





The expenses for R&D performed by external actors 
located abroad divided by the number of employees  
1,2 2008 
INNO COOPERATION The number of innovation cooperation partners with 




The number of innovation cooperation partners with 




The number of innovation cooperation partners with 
external actors located abroad 
1,2 2008 
PATENT Binary: 1 if a firm applied for a patent 1 2008 
ABANDONED PROJECT   Binary: 1 if a firm abandoned an innovation project 
without results  
1 2008 
TRAINING  Binary: 1 if a firm organized training as part of the 
innovation activity  
1 2008 
MEDIUM-SIZED FIRMS 250–500 employees 1,2 2008 
LARGE-SIZED FIRMS More than 500 employees 1,2 2008 
INDUSTRY Industry dummies (2-digit classification)   1,2 2008 
INNFIRM  
 
The turnover from product innovation that is new to the 




The turnover from product innovation that is new to the 








To test the complementary relationship between innovation strategies, we use a two-step 
approach: adoption and performance. In the adoption approach, we examine whether firms adopt 
different innovation strategies. In the performance approach, we check whether the 
implementation of one strategy pays off more once complementary activities are present 
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(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Schmiedeberg, 2008). Therefore, innovation strategies are used 
as dependent variables in the first step and as explanatory variables in the second step. The CIS 
allows us to distinguish the following different innovation strategies: INTERNAL R&D, 
DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D, INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D, DOMESTIC INNO 
COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL INNO COOPERATION and INNO COOPERATION. 
The first variable, INTERNAL R&D, represents the expenses for own R&D. The second and 
third strategies concern external R&D and refer to the expenditures for R&D performed by 
external actors, such as other parts of the business group, other companies, approved 
technological service institutes, universities and colleges, and other public research institutions. 
We distinguish here DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D and INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL 
R&D, in which the external actors are located in Denmark and abroad, respectively. To control 
for the firm size effect in R&D spending, we divide the expenses for internal R&D, domestic 
external R&D and international external R&D by the total number of employees (Grimpe and 
Kaiser, 2010).  
 
Table VII – Industry breakdown   
Technology class Classification of manufacturing industry NACE 
Low-technology 
manufacturing industries  
Food and beverages, tobacco  
Textiles, leather, footwear  








Non-metallic mineral products  
Metal products 
Rubber and plastic products  








Electrical apparatus, computing machines, communication equipment 




Source: OECD (2003) 
 
Another set of dependent variables (i.e. DOMESTIC INNO COOPERATION, 
INTERNATIONAL INNO COOPERATION, INNO COOPERATION) refers to a firm’s 
innovation cooperation strategy. The CIS lists different types of innovation cooperation partners 
(i.e. suppliers, customers, competitors, approved technological service institutes, consulting 
organizations, companies from other industries (excluding customers and suppliers), universities, 
public research institutions, public services and other public institutions), and the respondents 
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were asked to indicate whether they collaborate with the above-listed partners in Denmark, 
Europe, the USA, China and/or other locations. The variable DOMESTIC INNO 
COOPERATION refers to a number of innovation collaboration partners in Denmark, whereas 
INTERNATIONAL INNO COOPERATION stands for a number of innovation collaboration 
partners abroad.10 The variable INNO COOPERATION represents the total number of 
collaboration arrangements with local and international actors. 
 
Table VIII – Descriptive statistics 
Variable names Obs. Mean Std dev. Min. Max. 
INTERNAL R&D 491 49.921 110.81 0 1024.0 
DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D 491 2.5512 13.428 0 163.18 
INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D 491 5.8986 36.376 0 475.57 
INNO COOPERATION   491 3.1018 5.1908 0 32 
DOMESTIC INNO COOPERATION  491 0.9124 1.6886 0 10 
INTERNATIONAL INNO COOPERATION  491   1.1771 2.7787 0 24 
PATENT 491 0.2362 0.4252 0 1 
ABANDONED PROJECT  491 0.1608 0.3678 0 1 
TRAINING  491 0.4155 0.4934 0 1 
MEDIUM-SIZED FIRMS  491 0.1812 0.3856 0 1 
LARGE-SIZED FIRMS  491 0.1527 0.3601 0 1 
MEDIUM-TECH INDUSTRY   491 0.4582 0.4987 0 1 
HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY  491 0.2647 0.4416 0 1 
INNFIRM 491 0.2723 0.2965 0 1 
INNMARKET 491 0.15559 0.2675 0 1 
INNWORLD 491 0.08204 0.2210 0 1 
 
To explain a firm’s innovation behaviour, we consider several explanatory variables in the 
econometric analysis. First, we control for whether a firm is innovative or not. For this purpose, 
we use the PATENT variable, which indicates whether a company applied for a patent during the 
2006–2008 period. Second, we account for whether a firm has terminated an innovation project 
without a result (ABANDONED PROJECT). Firms often fail to complete an innovation project 
due to the gap between their existing resources and those needed to execute the innovation 
project successfully (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1990). To cope with this issue, companies 
                                                          
10The number of cooperation cases in the USA, China and other locations is very small; therefore, we combine these 
three categories into one, implying that international innovation cooperation counts the number of collaboration 
partners in Europe and in other countries (the USA, China and others).The variable receives a positive count if a 
firm has at least one innovation partner in one of the countries – the USA, China and others. 
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collaborate with external actors to acquire the necessary resources and to improve their 
innovation processes (Keupp and Gassmann, 2009). In this sense, we expect a positive 
relationship between ABANDONED PROJECT and R&D openness. In addition, we introduce a 
TRAINING variable into the econometric model. The variable indicates whether a firm conducts 
training as part of its innovation activities. As training improves employees’ formal and/or 
specific qualifications and, hence, enhances the firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990), we presume that those companies that provide their employees with training as part of 
their innovation activities are more likely to increase their degree of openness in innovation than 
others that undertake no such activities, because substantial internal expertise is required to 
utilize external knowledge effectively.  
 
Table IX– Correlation table  
 
 Variable names 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 INTERNAL R&D 1.000             
2 DOMESTIC 
EXTERNAL R&D 
0.234*** 1.000            
3 INTERNATIONAL 
EXTERNAL R&D 
0.307*** 0.227*** 1.000           
4 INNO COOPERATION  
 
0.355*** 0.147*** 0.327*** 1.000          
5 DOMESTIC INNO 
COOPERATION  
0.177*** 0.110** 0.115** 0.501*** 1.000         
6 INTERNATIONAL 
INNO COOPERATION  
0.336*** 0.117*** 0.210*** 0.617*** 0.666*** 1.000        
7 PATENT  
 
0.321*** 0.092** 0.210*** 0.346*** 0.261*** 0.328*** 1.000       
8 ABANDONED 
PROJECT  
0.143*** 0.020 0.040 0.411*** 0.282*** 0.249*** 0.252*** 1.000      
9 TRAINING  
 
0.159*** 0.047 0.111*** 0.313*** 0.253*** 0.207*** 0.177*** 0.206*** 1.000     
10 MEDIUM-SIZED 
FIRMS  
-0.001 -0.040 0.002 0.063 0.090*** 0.086* 0.037 0.053 0.047 1.000    
11 LARGE-SIZED FIRMS  
 
0.113** 0.112** 0.111** 0.376*** 0.230*** 0.287*** 0.203*** 0.168*** 0.045 -0.199*** 1.000   
12 MEDIUM-TECH 
INDUSTRY 
-0.211*** -0.046 -0.125*** -0.121*** -0.044 -0.141*** 0.085* 0.008 0.073 -0.040 -0.106** 1.000  
13 HIGH-TECH 
INDUSTRY  
0.379*** 0.094** 0.231*** 0.261*** 0.137*** 0.247*** 0.133*** 0.076* 0.076 -0.078* 0.027 -0.551*** 1.000 
Note:  *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
In the second step, the dependent variables are the turnovers from different types of product 
innovation. To measure the novelty of new products, the CIS asked the respondents to indicate 
whether a company introduced a product that was new to the firm but known on a market (1), 
new to the firm’s own market (2) or new to the world (3). The first question relates to product 
imitation rather than to product innovation. The second question describes whether firms 
introduced a product that was new to their own market, but might already have been introduced 
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to other markets in which the firms do not perform. In the final question, firms were asked to 
indicate whether they had introduced a completely new product to the world. Therefore, we 
consider a product that is new to the world to be characterized by a higher degree of novelty than 
others. Taking into account that the success of a new product depends on its market acceptance, 
we use the turnovers from product innovations as dependent variables in the analysis (Cassiman 
and Veugelers, 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). Thus, we use three 
measures of product innovation. First, we take the share of turnover from the product that is new 
to the firm but known in the market (INNFIRM). The second dependent variable is the share of 
the turnover from the product that is new to the firm’s own market (INNMARKET), and the 
third one is the share of the turnover from the product that is new to the world (INNWORLD) 
(see Table VI). 
 
Table X–Distribution of firms across industries, size classes and trends in innovation 
activities 
 
Variable names Frequency Percentages 
FIRM SIZE    
Fewer than 249 employees 327 66.60 
250–500 employees 89 18.13 
More than 500 employees 75 15.27 
INDUSTRY   
Low-tech manufacturing industries  136 27.70 
Medium-tech manufacturing industries 225 45.82 
High-tech manufacturing industries 130 26.48 
INTERNAL R&D   
Yes 323 65.78 
DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D   
Yes 131 26.68 
INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D   
Yes 80 16.29 
DOMESTIC INNO COOPERATION    
Yes 157 31.98 
INTERNATIONAL INNO COOPERATION   
Yes 75 15.70 
INNFIRM   
Yes 168 34.22 
INNMARKET   
Yes 126 25.66 
INNWORLD   




To explain a firm’s product innovation performance, we use innovation strategies (i.e. 
INTERNAL R&D, DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D, INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D, 
DOMESTIC INNO COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL INNO COOPERATION, INNO 
COOPERATION) as explanatory variables in the second-step analysis. To control for other 
factors that may influence the estimation results of the first- and second-step analyses, we 
introduce firm size and industry dummies into the econometric models. Firm size is measured by 
the number of employees. Specifically, we create three size groups: fewer than 250employees,11 
between 250 and 499 employees, and more than 500 employees. As regards the industry 
dummies, we break down industries into three groups (OECD, 2003): low-technology 
manufacturing industries,12 medium-technology manufacturing industries13 and high-technology 
manufacturing industries. An overview of the industry technology classes is provided in Table 
VII. 
 
Looking at the sample distribution of the variables, Table X shows that a large share (45%) of 
firms operate in medium-technology manufacturing industries, whereas 28% and 26% of 
companies come from low- and high-technology manufacturing industries, respectively. 
Regarding the firm size distribution in the sample, those firms that have fewer than 249 
employees account for 66%. Companies with 250–499 employees and more than 500 employees 
represent 18% and 15%, respectively. 
 
Furthermore, Table X shows that the firms in our sample differ substantially in terms of their 
innovation activities. As the data indicate, 65% of firms invest in internal R&D. Compared with 
internal R&D, external R&D is less intensive among Danish companies: 26% of firms report 
domestic external R&D and 16% international external R&D. With regard to innovation 
cooperation strategies, 31% of companies cooperate with domestic actors, whereas 15% of 
enterprises engage in innovation cooperation with international entities. Considering the trends in 
product innovation, 34% of firms introduce products that are new to their company, but known 
                                                          
11 Firms with fewer than 250 employees are taken as the reference category in the econometric analysis.  
12 The group of low-technology manufacturing industries is taken as the reference category in the econometric 
analysis. 
13 Medium-low and medium-high technology manufacturing industries are grouped into one category, because the 
number of observations in medium-low technology manufacturing industries is low.  
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on a market. Companies that develop products that are new to their own market and new to the 
world account for 25% and 16%, respectively. 
 
3.4 Econometric models 
As described in the previous section, we employ the adoption and the performance approach to 
check whether there is a complementary or a substitutive relationship between innovation 
strategies (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Schmiedeberg, 2008). To confirm a complementary 
effect in the adoption approach, a positive and significant correlation must be present between 
the adopted activities. However, the pair-wise correlation between innovation activities does not 
allow us to prove the existence of complementarities, because positive and significant signs can 
be driven by other exogenous factors that influence the organizational decision to adopt different 
innovation strategies (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Schmiedeberg, 2008). To control for the 
possible exogenous factors, we first conduct a regression analysis for each innovation strategy, 
then we extract the residuals from the estimations and check for correlations between them, 
which are called conditional correlations. To identify the complementary condition in the 
performance approach, the coefficients of the interaction term between innovation strategies 
have to be significantly larger than zero. 
The first set of dependent variables (i.e. INTERNAL R&D, DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D and 
INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D) used in the adoption approach has continuous 
outcomes, whereas the second set of dependent variables (i.e. INNO COOPERATION, 
DOMESTIC INNO COOPERATION and INTERNATIONAL INNO COOPERATION) has 
count outcomes. All of these variables are skewed to the right, containing a high number of 
zeros; there are numbers of firms that do not perform the above-mentioned R&D activities. To 
account for the specific features of the data, we use the generalized linear model (GLM) 
introduced by Nelder and Wedderburn (1972). The GLM is flexible and allows us to use 
dependent variables with non-normal distribution by introducing a proper family distribution and 
link function. We use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to compare models with different 
family distributions and link functions (a model with a low value of the AIC is considered the 
model that best fits the data). The comparative analysis suggests a gamma distribution with a log 
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link function for INTERNAL R&D, DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D and INTERNATIONAL 
EXTERNAL R&D and a negative binomial distribution with a log link function for INNO 
COOPERATION, DOMESTIC INNO COOPERATION and INTERNATIONAL INNO 
COOPERATION. A robust option is also included in the econometric models to obtain robust 
standard errors if the family distribution is incorrectly specified. 
 
In the second step, the performance approach, the dependent variables are the turnovers from 
different types of product innovation: INNFIRM, INNMARKET and INNWORLD. The 
variables have continuous outcomes that fall between zero and one. As many firms do not 
engage in product innovation and hence report no turnover from product innovation, the 
dependent variables contain a high number of zeros. For this reason, the right-censored tobit 
model is used to account adequately for this specific feature of our data by treating firms with 
and without product innovation differently (Schmiedeberg, 2008; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). 
 
3.5 Estimation results 
3.5.1 Adoption approach 
For the analysis of complementarity, the adoption approach is applied first. Table XI shows the 
conditional correlations for the complementarity analysis. Table XII presents the results 
regarding whether and to which degree firms take up certain innovation strategies. 
For the conditional correlations among the various innovation strategies in Table XI, we find far 
fewer significant correlations than in Table IX stating the unconditional correlations; the latter 
are all significantly positive. Turning to the conditional correlations, we find that our empirical 
model contains quite a number of variables that account for unconditional correlations.  
More specifically, we find the following conditional relations. For the internal–external R&D 
relationship, a significant correlation exists between INTERNAL R&D and INTERNATIONAL 
EXTERNAL R&D, which suggests that these innovation strategies are additive. Contrariwise, 
DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D is not related to either of them. As discussed in section 2.2, this 
may have to do with the fact that the effective utilization of external R&D sourced from 
international, rather than from domestic, marketplaces may require a more advanced level of 
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internal absorptive capacity. For this reason, those firms acquiring international, rather than 
domestic, external R&D invest more intensely in internal R&D. The result is in line with our 
H1a hypothesis. 
Looking at cooperation strategies, we find that the INTERNATIONAL INNO COOPERATION 
and DOMESTIC INNO COOPERATION are significantly and highly correlated with each other. 
Via construction both are related to INNO COOPERATION. As evidenced by the insignificant 
conditional correlations, INTERNAL R&D does not show a significant connection with any of 
the innovation cooperation variables. Considering external R&D activities and innovation 
cooperation, complementarity can only be detected between INNO COOPERATION and 
INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D. All the other conditional correlations between the 
specific versions of innovation cooperation and DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D are not 
significant. Hence, the conditional correlation analysis partially confirms our H1b hypothesis in 
which we suggest that those firms acquiring international, rather than domestic, external R&D 
are more likely to engage in international innovation cooperation partnerships. In other words, 
the data analysis suggests that it is innovation cooperation in general and not the international 
dimension that correlates significantly and positively with international external R&D. 
 
Table XI –Conditional correlation table 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 INTERNAL R&D 1.0000      
2 DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D 0.0660 1.0000     
3 INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D 0.1102** 0.0257 1.0000    
4 INNO COOPERATION  0.0824 0.0502 0.1801*** 1.0000   
5 DOMESTIC INNO COOPERATION  0.0065 0.0844 0.0652 0.3005*** 1.0000  
6 INTERNATIONAL INNO COOPERATION  0.0936 0.1352 0.0514 0.3450*** 0.5769*** 1.0000 
Note: ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
As for the control variables used in the first-step analysis, the results show that innovativeness 
proxied by the PATENT variable is significantly and positively associated with internal R&D 
(INTERNAL R&D) as well as with all the innovation cooperation variables (i.e. INNO 
COOPERATION, DOMESTIC INNO COOPERATION and INTERNATIONAL INNO 
COOPERATION); however, it shows no significant relationship with DOMESTIC EXTERNAL 
R&D and INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D. The data suggest that innovative firms invest 
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in internal R&D and also engage in a high number of innovation cooperation partnerships. The 
relationship with external R&D remains unclear; here it would be interesting to know whether 
the purchased R&D results are used for the buying firm’s own patented innovations or contribute 
to not-patented innovations, such as process innovations that are often used immediately in the 
production process. It may equivalently hold that relying heavily on external R&D in innovation 
may cause shifting knowledge creation capabilities from the client firm towards an R&D 
provider (Bettis et al., 1992; Weigelt, 2009).  
 
Table XII – Estimation results for innovation strategies  
 GLM MODELS 








































































































































































Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; S.E. in parentheses. 
 
Regarding the other independent variables, ABANDONED PROJECT is significantly and 
positively associated with INNO COOPERATION and also with DOMESTIC INNO 
COOPERATION, but it shows no significant relationship with INTERNAL R&D. Here, firms 
that failed to complete an innovation project show a higher inclination towards an open 
innovation framework. Our data do not allow a causal interpretation here; it might be that firms 
with abandoned projects hope to improve on them with the help of cooperation partners; 
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however, it might also hold that in research cooperation projects are much more easily 
abandoned. Moreover, ABANDONED PROJECT is associated significantly with neither 
DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D nor INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D.  
Regarding TRAINING, this variable is significantly and positively related to INTERNAL R&D 
and all the innovation cooperation variables (i.e. INNO COOPERATION, DOMESTIC INNO 
COOPERATION and INTERNATIONAL INNO COOPERATION); it shows no significant 
relationship with DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D and INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D. 
This might be due to the fact that executing innovation projects internally and in cooperation is 
connected to training activities and therefore a high level of internal expertise; drawing on 
external R&D, however, does not show a systematic relationship with training activities, 
suggesting that firms without a higher level of internal expertise may also purchase R&D results 
from specialized external providers.  
Turning to the firm size variables, MEDIUM-SIZED FIRMS and LARGE-SIZED FIRMS have a 
significant and positive correlation with INNO COOPERATION (including DOMESTIC INNO 
COOPERATION and INTERNATIONAL INNO COOPERATION). As large-sized firms 
possess strong research capabilities in terms of financial, physical and human resources, they are 
more likely to cooperate with a wide set of external actors in innovation than their small 
counterparts. 
Last but not least, the estimation results indicate a non-significant relationship between the 
industry dummies (i.e. MEDIUM-TECH INDUSTRY, HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY) and R&D 
openness with regard to domestic partnerships (i.e. DOMESTIC INNO COOPERATION, 
DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D). In line with previous studies, the data analysis shows that 
there are not many inter-industry differences in terms of adopting open innovation principles 
(Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006; Huizingh, 2011). However, regarding international knowledge 
sourcing, HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY shows significant positive signs for INTERNATIONAL 
INNO COOPERATION and INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D. This industry group is also 
significant and positive for INTERNAL R&D, whereas MEDIUM-TECH INDUSTRY is neither 
significant for international partnerships (i.e. INTERNATIONAL INNO COOPERATION, 
INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D) nor significant for internal R&D (INTERNAL R&D). 
It is not surprising that high-technology manufacturing firms have higher internal R&D spending 
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than their counterparts from low- and medium-technology manufacturing sectors, ‘because the 
definition of low technology and high technology firms is itself based on the firms’ share of 
expenditures on R&D’ (Kirner et al., 2009: 450). As for the positive correlation between HIGH-
TECH INDUSTRY and international partnerships (i.e. INTERNATIONAL INNO 
COOPERATION and INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D), this might be explained by the 
small market size of Denmark. More concretely, Danish firms operating in high-technology 
manufacturing industries may engage in international R&D partnerships to increase their product 
sales on the global market and, as a result, to cover the high costs of their R&D activities and to 
cope with the small domestic market size (von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002). 
 
3.5.2 Performance approach 
 
Having discussed the results from the adoption approach, we turn our attention towards the 
performance approach. In relation to the innovation performance of firms, we distinguish 
between new to the firm (INNFIRM), new to the market (INNMARKET) and new to the world 
(INNWORLD) innovations, which allows us to examine whether different forms of R&D 
openness are complementary or substitutive in product imitation and innovation. 
Complementarity between innovation strategies is given when the respective interaction terms 
show a significantly positive coefficient. It indicates that the two innovation strategies together 
are related to a higher innovation output. Since we measure the implementation of the strategies 
and the innovation output in different years, we can carefully assume a causal relationship here. 
 
Table XIII shows that domestic external R&D (DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D) as well as 
innovation cooperation (INNO COOPERATION) in general and domestic innovation 
cooperation (DOMESTIC INNO COOPERATION) in particular are significantly and positively 
associated with product imitation (INNFIRM). Other innovation strategies, such as internal R&D 
(INTERNAL R&D) and international partnerships (i.e. INTERNATIONAL INNO 
COOPERATION and INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D), provide no significant signs for 
INNFIRM. Similarly, these innovation strategies are non-significant for INNMARKET (see 
Table XIV), which is somewhere between imitation and innovation. As the data analysis 
suggests, only INNO COOPERATION and DOMESTIC INNO COOPERATION are related 
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significantly and positively to INNMARKET. Surprisingly, none of the external R&D variables 
(i.e. DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D and INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D) provides a 
significant sign for this type of innovation output.  
 
Table XIII – Estimation results for innovation performance (INNFIRM) 
 TOBIT MODEL 
INNFIRM INNFIRM INNFIRM INNFIRM INNFIRM INNFIRM 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
INTERNAL R&D 
 
DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D 
 




MEDIUM-SIZED  FIRMS 
 






DOMESTIC INNO COOPERATION  
 
INTERNATIONAL INNO COOPERATION  
 
DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D*INTERNAL R&D 
 
INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D* INTERNAL R&D 
 
DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D*INNO COOP 
 












































































































































































































Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; S.E. in parentheses. 
 
In contrast, the empirical analysis shows that when firms attempt to obtain breakthrough 
innovations (INNWOLRD), they invest more intensively in internal R&D and opt for 
international knowledge sourcing than others that try to imitate. In particular, the results indicate 
that INTERNAL R&D and INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D are significantly and 
positively correlated with INNWOLRD (see Table XV). The data analysis also shows that 
innovation cooperation in general and international innovation cooperation in particular are 
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significant and positive for product innovation that is new to the world; domestic innovation 
cooperation provides a non-significant sign for INNWOLRD, whereas domestic external R&D is 
significantly and negatively related to this specific type of product innovation. As one can see 
from the empirical analysis, domestic knowledge sourcing is positively related to a low degree of 
product innovation (i.e. INNFIRM and INNMARKET), whereas internal R&D activities and 
international knowledge sourcing are positively associated with a high degree of product 
innovation (i.e. INNWORLD). 
 
Table XIV– Estimation results for innovation performance (INNMARKET)   
 TOBIT MODEL 
INNMARKET INNMARKET INNMARKET INNMARKET INNMARKET INNMARKET 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
INTERNAL R&D 
 
DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D 
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Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; S.E. in parentheses. 
The results obtained from the performance analysis are in line with our H2a hypothesis, in which 
we suggest that those firms acquiring international, rather than domestic, external R&D are more 
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likely to introduce product innovation with a higher degree of novelty. This might be related to 
the fact that international partnerships may allow firms to work with world-class suppliers and to 
access resources that are unavailable within the domestic market. As a consequence, companies 
sourcing knowledge from international markets perform better in product innovation than their 
counterparts that rely only on domestic resources.  
Regarding the complementarity between the innovation strategies, the data analysis provides 
contradictory results. More specifically, while the adoption analysis identifies an additive 
relationship between INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D and INTERNAL R&D as well as 
between INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D and INNO COOPERATION, the performance 
analysis suggests that combining these innovation strategies relates negatively to product 
innovation; the interaction terms between INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D and 
INTERNAL R&D as well as between INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D and INNO 
COOPERATION are significantly and negatively associated with INNWORLD (see Table XV), 
but the coefficients of these interaction terms are very low. The latter interaction term 
(INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL R&D*INNO COOPERATION) also has negative signs for 
INNMARKET. In addition, pursuing simultaneously DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D and INNO 
COOPERATION strategies is negatively related to INNFIRM and INNWORLD. Hence, the 
relevant significant coefficients are all negative, which indicates no complementarity between 
the innovation strategies.14 This might be linked to the fact that a high degree of openness in 
innovation may cause the absorptive capacity problem. In other words, to integrate external 
knowledge into the internal R&D, a common interface has to be established that requires 
absorptive capacity to identify and transform external knowledge for internal purposes (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990). As firms engage in different forms of R&D openness, they may lack 
adequate internal expertise to manage external partnerships effectively. Moreover, when there 
are many ideas for a firm to choose between, only a few of them will be given the required level 
of attention and effort to be implemented (Koput, 1997; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). For these 
                                                          
14 The interaction terms between other innovation strategies (i.e. internal R&D*international innovation cooperation, 
internal R&D*domestic innovation cooperation, domestic external R&D*international innovation cooperation, 
domestic external R&D*domestic innovation cooperation, international external R&D*international innovation 
cooperation, international external R&D*domestic innovation cooperation) provide non-significant signs in the 
performance analysis. Therefore, we do not present the results in Tables XIII, XIV and XV.  
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reasons, a high degree of R&D openness is expected to have negative effects on firms’ 
innovation performance (Laursen and Salter, 2006). 
 
Table XV– Estimation results for innovation performance (INNWORLD) 
 TOBIT MODEL 
INNWORLD INNWORLD INNWORLD INNWORLD INNWORLD INNWORLD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
INTERNAL R&D 
 
DOMESTIC EXTERNAL R&D 
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Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; S.E. in parentheses. 
 
Furthermore, the data analysis indicates that firm size is slightly significant and positive for 
INNFIRM, but it shows a non-significant relationship with INNMARKET and INNWORLD. 
This result is in line with other studies suggesting that firm size does not matter for a substantial 
product innovation (Laursen and Salter, 2006; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). Regarding the industry 
dummies, MEDIUM-TECH INDUSTRY is significantly and positively associated with 
INNMARKET, whereas HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY is significantly and positively related to 
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INNFIRM. Both of the industry groups show a significant positive correlation with 
INNWORLD. In agreement with prior research, the estimation results suggest that firms 
operating in low-technology manufacturing industries lag behind companies belonging to 
medium- and high-technology manufacturing industries in terms of product innovation 
performance (Kirner et al., 2009).  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The paper contributes to the current debate on complementarities between different types of 
innovation strategies. Rather than using standard yes or no answers to identify the use of such 
instruments, the paper uses the amount of money invested in those activities. This allows us to 
study the inter-relationship between external R&D, internal R&D, innovation cooperation and 
product innovation in more detail. Our data also allow us to differentiate external R&D based on 
a geographical location, that is, whether it comes from domestic or international marketplaces. 
 
To study the complementary relationship between the innovation strategies, we present a two-
step approach: adoption and performance. In the adoption approach, first, we conduct a 
regression analysis for each of the innovation activities. After that, we extract the residuals from 
each of the regressions and check the correlations between them. In the performance approach, 
we use the interaction term to check the complementary relationship between the innovation 
strategies. The two-step analysis suggests that those firms acquiring international external R&D 
simultaneously invest in internal R&D as well as engaging in a high number of innovation 
cooperation partnerships, but the joint representation of these instruments shows a significant 
negative relationship with product innovation. This might be due to the fact that engaging in 
different forms of R&D openness may cause the over-searching problem and, hence, deteriorate 
firms’ product innovation performance. Furthermore, no significant complementary or 
substitutive relationship is found between domestic external R&D and internal R&D as well as 
between domestic external R&D and innovation cooperation. Regarding the relationship between 
external R&D and product innovation, we find that firms acquiring international, rather than 
domestic, external R&D are more likely to generate product innovation with a higher degree of 
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novelty, because sourcing knowledge from international marketplaces allows companies to tap 
into the global knowledge pool and, as a result, to improve their innovation performance. 
 
While the paper contributes to the current literature on complementarities between different 
innovation activities and their links with product novelty, it also has several limitations. First of 
all, our dataset is cross-sectional and does not allow us to examine changes in variables over 
time. Moreover, for future research, it is vital for the inter-relationship between external R&D 
and product innovation to be studied more concretely. In particular, one should examine whether 




4 The innovative performance of R&D outsourcing  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Nowadays, firms are under great pressure to reduce the costs of their R&D activities and to 
speed up their new technology and product development to respond efficiently and effectively to 
the increased global competition, the fast pace of technological changes and shortened product 
life cycles (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough et al., 2006; Holcomb and Hitt, 2007; Keupp and 
Gassmann, 2009). All these requirements lead firms to specialize in a limited number of key 
areas and to outsource rather peripheral R&D activities to independent research organizations 
(Quinn, 1999, 2000). R&D outsourcing, which implies the acquisition of knowledge-based 
resources from external actors via contracts, enables companies to concentrate on the narrow sets 
of research functions that they can perform best and to use the R&D services of specialized 
research organizations for the activities in which they lack high-class expertise. Consequently, 
R&D outsourcing may allow firms to acquire high-quality knowledge inputs from specialized 
research organizations and to share the costs and risks of R&D projects with them (Mowery, 
1983; Dess et al., 1995; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000). Furthermore, by distributing R&D tasks 
among different external actors, firms shift their R&D activities from serial to synchronous 
actions so that these activities are implemented independently and simultaneously, resulting in an 
increased speed of R&D processes (Howells et al., 2003; Langlois, 2003; Ebrahim et al., 2009).  
 
However, R&D outsourcing also has its drawbacks. First, distributing R&D activities among 
external providers may induce a firm to specialize in combining externally available technologies 
rather than to develop its own (West et al., 2006). For instance, Prencipe et al. (2003) suggest 
that nowadays large companies organize whole projects, but develop only a small part of the sub-
technologies internally. In this sense, those firms that increasingly outsource their R&D activities 
may shift their knowledge creation capabilities to supplier organizations (Bettis et al., 1992; 
Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; West et al., 2006). As a result, R&D outsourcing may deplete a client 
firm’s research competencies and deteriorate its R&D performance (Bettis et al., 1992). The 
second issue is that the knowledge-based resources acquired from external actors via contracts 
may not be unique, because competitors may have access to the expertise of the same supplier 
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(Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). In other words, knowledge may unintentionally spillover from a 
supplier to multiple clients firms while working with them. Moreover, the effective utilization of 
external knowledge sourced through R&D outsourcing requires substantial expertise from the 
client firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). As R&D outsourcing may replace learning-by-doing 
activities in internal R&D and, hence, deteriorate a client firm’s integrative competencies, this 
strategy may hamper the overall innovative performance of the firm (Bettis et al., 1992; Weigelt, 
2009). Given these mixed potential value-creating outcomes of R&D outsourcing, the question 
arises of whether those firms that outsource R&D tasks generate a higher-quality research output 
from their R&D processes than their counterparts that do not invest in this strategy. 
 
Motivated by this question, a number of studies examine the relationship between R&D 
outsourcing and R&D output, in which the quality of the R&D output is most commonly 
measured as sales from product innovations (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Berchicci, 2013) and 
patent counts (Beneito, 2006). These papers contribute significantly to our understanding of the 
performance implication of R&D outsourcing, but the indicators of R&D output (e.g. sales from 
product innovation, patent counts) used in the studies may not reflect the overall quality of 
outsourcer firms’ research processes. For example, a product innovation might be a result of 
combining externally available knowledge inputs, and it may not be a good indicator of the 
quality of the internal research process. In other words, the knowledge and production 
boundaries of a firm may differ (Brusoni et al., 2001). An alternative measure of R&D output, 
such as patent counts, shows firms’ property rights upon their inventions, but patents may vary 
significantly in terms of their quality and innovative contents (Griliches, 1990). Therefore, 
further research is required to understand how R&D outsourcing is associated with the quality of 
a firm’s research process. 
 
To study this issue, I analyse the data obtained from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) and 
the European Patent Office (EPO). The former provides detailed information about the 
innovation activities of German firms (e.g. expenditures on internal and outsourced R&D, 
innovation impediments, product and process innovation, R&D cooperation partners, etc.), 
whereas the latter provides data about the patents applied for by German firms at the EPO. To 
capture the value of firms’ R&D effort, I use the average forward citations that firms’ patents 
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obtain in subsequent time periods weighted by their patent counts to measure the quality of the 
firms’ inventive activities (Trajtenberg, 1990). In other words, to evaluate the value of a firm’s 
inventive activities, I check how many times its inventions (patents) are cited by subsequent 
patents of other firms to account for the effect of the firm’s research output on subsequent 
technological development (Trajtenberg, 1990). Accordingly, I take the average forward patent 
citations as a dependent variable in the econometric analysis. The second dependent variable 
used in the analysis is patent counts, which are used to evaluate the relationship between R&D 
outsourcing and invention quantity.  
 
Looking at the econometric analysis, the results show that R&D outsourcing is significantly and 
positively associated with invention quantity. As inter- rather than intra-firm knowledge-based 
resources are more likely to vary, those companies acquiring R&D from an external provider 
may have more chance of accessing diverse knowledge inputs and, as a result, performing better 
in invention activities than their counterparts that experiment only with internal knowledge. In 
other words, this strategy may help firms to access complementary knowledge inputs and, in this 
way, to improve their invention performance. However, this positive performance implication of 
R&D outsourcing does not appear to hold for invention quality. Furthermore, the empirical 
analysis indicates that the intensity of R&D outsourcing is significantly related neither to 
invention quantity nor to invention quality.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized in the following way. Section 4.2 discusses the theoretical 
arguments for the hypotheses’ development. Section 4.3 reviews the database and variables used 
in the econometric analysis. Section 4.4 presents the econometric methods. After that, Section 
4.5 provides the estimation results and Section 4.6 concludes.  
 
4.2 Theoretical framework 
In this section, the relationship between R&D outsourcing and the inventive performance of a 
firm is examined. R&D outsourcing is considered to be an important instrument for acquiring the 
necessary resources from external actors, reducing the costs and risks of R&D projects and 
accelerating new technology and product development (Quinn, 1999, 2000; Howells et al., 2003; 
80 
 
Calantone and Stanko, 2007; Howells et al., 2008). However, this strategy may also involve 
considerable risks in terms of declining internal R&D activities, depleting firms’ research or 
knowledge-creation competencies and, as a result, deteriorating the overall performance of their 
R&D processes (Bettis et al., 1992; Kotabe, 1992; Weigelt, 2009). To understand the conditions 
under which firms experience ‘gain’ or ‘pain’ from R&D outsourcing, I use insights from 
transaction cost theory (TCT) and the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm. The two theories 
attempt to explain the boundaries of the firm, but from different perspectives. While TCT is 
considered to be a cost-based approach, the RBV of the firm is seen as a resource-oriented 
framework.  
 
Transaction cost theory 
From the TCT perspective, an outsourcing decision is considered to be an economically optimal 
choice if it is cheaper to buy certain goods or services in a market than to make them within a 
firm (Williamson, 1975, 1985). TCT assumes the dominance of the market mechanism over the 
hierarchical organization or internal governance mode, because the market competition among 
outside suppliers forces them to eliminate inefficient practices and, hence, to reduce their prices; 
the same level of competition is less likely to occur between the business units of a firm (Vining 
and Globerman, 1999; Geyskens et al., 2006; Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). However, a market 
governance mode may also increase the transaction costs when the goods or services that a firm 
aims to acquire from independent contractors are characterized by high levels of asset specificity 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985; Geyskens et al., 2006; Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). Resources with a 
high degree of asset specificity are designed to serve a single purpose or transaction and may not 
have an alternative function. Acquiring such resources from external entities may cause 
dependency of one party on another and give rise to a ‘hold-up’ problem (Ulset, 1996; Vining 
and Globerman, 1999). The term ‘hold-up problem’ refers to the situation in which one party 
makes a transaction-specific investment and another transacting partner has the opportunity to 
take advantage of that commitment in terms of maximizing its value and reducing the rents of the 
former party (Vining and Globerman, 1999). For instance, when a client firms builds up its 
production line so that it depends on specific resources acquired from a particular supplier, the 
latter may have the opportunity to increase the prices of the resources unscrupulously and 
maximize its profit, because the transaction-specific investment has already been made by the 
81 
 
client firm. To safeguard against such a situation in transactions, a well-negotiated or complete 
contract is required. However, given that firm managers have bounded rationality and limited 
cognitive abilities (Simon, 1957), they may face difficulties in considering all the possible 
contingencies and specifying all the contract terms precisely to avoid opportunism or 
unscrupulously behaviour from their transaction partners (Vining and Globerman, 1999; 
Calantone and Stanko, 2007). As highly specific assets are also considered to be firm-specific, 
the quality of such resources may not be readily observable and measurable by an external actor. 
Accordingly, acquiring resources with high levels of asset specificity may increase the 
transaction costs in terms of negotiating for contractual terms and then monitoring and enforcing 
the contract performance. As a result, the market mechanism may become inefficient herein. 
Hence, a degree of asset specificity determines whether economic activities are internalized or 
outsourced.  
 
R&D activities are frequently characterized by high levels of asset specificity, because they are 
partially tacit in nature and firm-specific. Tacit knowledge, which refers to know-how and skills, 
is accumulated over time through learning by doing, and it is embodied in individuals and 
organizational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). As the quality of such knowledge is not 
readily measurable, it can be difficult to evaluate a contractor’s expertise and the effort it will 
devote to a task (Pisano, 1990). Moreover, transferring tacit knowledge across organizations 
requires intensive interaction between firms that may increase the transaction costs. Therefore, 
R&D tasks that are specialized and firm-specific in character should be organized internally and 
those activities that are generic in nature should be outsourced. However, as the primary purpose 
of R&D activities is to enhance organizational learning and generate valuable resources, a cost-
based analysis may not be enough to explain completely the make-or-buy decision in R&D 
activities (Foss and Klein, 2010). In other words, a strategic or resource-oriented analysis is also 
required to identify an appropriate governance mode for certain innovation activities. 
 
The resource-based view of the firm 
The RBV of the firm takes up this issue by examining the role of internal and external 
governance modes in generating superior resources (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Grimp and 
Kaiser, 2010; Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). According to this theory, resources with valuable, 
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rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (VRIN) attributes determine the competitive advantage of 
a firm (Barney, 1991). These attributes of resources allow companies to pursue a value-creating 
strategy, to serve the market requirements better and, as a result, to outperform their competitors 
(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wang et al., 2009; Grimp and Kaiser, 2010). To sustain a 
competitive advantage on a long-term basis, the firm’s resources should be valuable and rare as 
well as having inimitable and non-substitutable features, because rivals should not be able to 
replicate the firm’s competitive assets or to attain a similar performance based on other 
resources. For this reason, firms often use an isolating mechanism to protect valuable and rare 
resources from imitation (Rumelt, 1984). One of the most powerful isolating mechanisms is 
considered to be the firm specificity of resources (Wang et al., 2009; Grimp and Kaiser, 2010), 
because such resources are not easily tradable across organization boundaries and they may also 
have less applicability outside the firm (Peteraf, 1993). Therefore, strategically important 
economic activities should be carried out internally to develop valuable and rare resources and to 
protect these resources from imitation. In this sense, R&D activities that determine the 
competitive advantage of a firm should be organized in-house and relatively peripheral 
knowledge-based activities should be contracted out to specialized R&D suppliers. By doing so, 
firms can devote their financial and human resources to the narrow sets of core activities that 
they can perform best and use an R&D service of an independent research organization for 
activities in which they have little or no expertise (Quinn, 1999, 2000; Calantone and Stanko, 
2007; Howells et al., 2008; McIvor, 2008). Given that a technological development is a complex 
process and it often involves different scientific areas, most companies lack adequate internal 
resources to be able to afford to carry out entire R&D processes internally (Chesbrough, 2003; 
Keupp and Gassmann, 2009). In this context, R&D outsourcing may serve a complementary 
purpose, helping firms to acquire resources that are unavailable internally. In fact, prior studies 
find that the marginal returns of internal R&D activities increase if a firm simultaneously 
outsources some parts of its R&D activities to specialized research organizations (Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006; Lokshin et al., 2008). 
 
The performance implication of R&D outsourcing  
Several potential benefits can be realized as a result of R&D outsourcing. First, firms may reduce 
the costs of R&D projects through outsourcing rather peripheral knowledge-based activities to a 
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cost-efficient specialized supplier. As the supplier may offer economies of scale by spreading the 
production costs over more units of output and selling products to multiple client firms, it might 
be cheaper for firms to use the services of specialized R&D suppliers for their peripheral R&D 
activities than to perform the same activities internally. Second, R&D outsourcing can help firms 
to spread the risks of R&D projects over independent research organizations (Quinn, 1992). In 
other words, it might be less risky to acquire certain technological knowledge from these 
organizations than to develop a new technology in areas in which the firm has little or no 
expertise. Third, the division of R&D tasks among firms enables them to shift their innovation 
activities from serial to parallel working processes and, hence, to accelerate new product and 
technology development (Howells et al., 2003; Ebrahim et al., 2009). Moreover, this strategy 
may allow firms to improve the quality of their R&D activities through outsourcing rather 
peripheral R&D tasks to a specialized R&D organization to which these are key activities 
(Mudambi and Tallman, 2010). Accordingly, the specialized R&D organization may possess 
superior knowledge-based resources as well as a more appropriate research infrastructure and, 
therefore, it may carry out these R&D tasks better than they can be implemented by the client 
firm (Quinn, 1992; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000). R&D outsourcing may also promote creativity 
within internal research activities, because new knowledge is brought in from an external actor. 
Evolutionary economists suggest that conducting R&D close to prior knowledge or specialized 
areas reduces the likelihood of errors and makes searches more reliable, but it may have a 
negative effect on the R&D output through decreasing intensity of new idea production (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Levinthal and March, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988; Pisano, 
1990). As innovation is considered to be a new combination of existing knowledge, firms may 
increase the opportunities for knowledge recombination and, hence, for innovation when they 
access resources that are unavailable internally. Since knowledge heterogeneity is more likely to 
be found between firms rather than within a firm, R&D outsourcing may help firms to enrich 
their internal stock of knowledge and to improve the quality and intensity of their R&D 
activities. Although knowledge-based resources sourced from R&D suppliers may not be unique 
and they might also be accessible by competitors, these external resources may enable firms to 
pursue a unique combination of external and internal knowledge, resulting in firm-specific 
resources (Grimp and Kaiser, 2010). Based on the above-developed arguments, I expect a 
84 
 
positive relationship between R&D outsourcing and the invention performance of a firm. Hence, 
the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H1: R&D outsourcing is positively associated with invention quantity as well as quality. 
 
The drawbacks of R&D outsourcing  
Although a firm obtains a number of benefits from outsourcing its R&D activities to specialized 
research organizations, a large scale of R&D outsourcing may deteriorate the overall invention 
performance of the firm for several reasons. First, this R&D strategy may reduce the internal 
learning-by-doing and problem-solving activities (Bettis et al., 1992; Weigelt, 2009; Grimpe and 
Kaiser, 2010), which are considered to be the primary source of new skills and know-how. In 
this sense, R&D outsourcing may deplete a firm’s research capabilities and shift knowledge 
creation competencies from the firm to an R&D supplier (Bettis et al., 1992). The second issue is 
that a company may not be able to internalize the tacit knowledge component of outsourced 
R&D activities via arm’s length transactions, because transferring such knowledge across 
organizational boundaries requires intensive interaction between transaction partners, which is 
not implied in the R&D outsourcing strategy. Accordingly, large-scale R&D outsourcing may 
hollow out tacit knowledge applications in internal R&D and limit the firm’s insights into 
codified knowledge components of innovation activities (Weigelt, 2009). Given that codified 
knowledge is relatively easy to imitate, relying greatly on R&D suppliers in innovation activities 
undermines the competitive advantages of a client firm. Moreover, as the knowledge-based 
resources acquired from an external supplier may not be unique (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010), 
large-scale R&D outsourcing may deplete a firm’s ability to develop valuable and rare resources. 
Based on the above-developed arguments, I expect a negative relationship between large-scale 
R&D outsourcing and the invention performance of the firm. Thus, I propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 





4.3 Data description  
4.3.1 Sample 
 
The dataset used in this study comes from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP)15 database. 
The MIP, which is the German part of the Community Innovation Survey, has been collected 
annually since 1993 by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW). The target 
population of the MIP is German innovative firms with at least five employees. The survey 
gathers detailed information on the innovation activities of the firms, such as the type of 
innovation partner, expenditures on internal and outsourced R&D, product and process 
innovation, etc. This dataset is supplemented by patent data obtained from the European Patent 
Office (EPO) to study the relationship between R&D outsourcing and invention performance. 
The EPO provides information about the patents applied for by German firms at the EPO from 
1978 until the end of the data (2011). In particular, I obtain information about the number of 
patents that German firms applied for at the EPO and the number of forward citations that these 
patents obtained in subsequent time periods. To have enough time windows to count the patent 
forward citations, which are used to measure the quality of a patent, the empirical analysis covers 
two waves (1997, 2001) of the MIP. In other words, two-year cross-sectional data are used in the 
analysis obtained from the 1997 and 2001 surveys of the MIP. I also restrict the sample to 
manufacturing firms and, as a result, I obtain 1568 observations and 784 firms that are each 
observed twice.  
 
4.3.2 Dependent variables 
Two types of dependent variables are considered in the empirical analysis. The first one 
(INV_N) is the number of patents filed by firm i in period t+3. Stated differently, INV_N refers 
to the number of patents that firms are granted in the periods 1998–2000 and 2002–2004, 
respectively to the 1997 and 2001 surveys. Given that patents vary significantly in terms of their 
quality and innovative contents (Narin and Olivastro, 1988; Griliches, 1990; Trajtenberg, 1990), 
as the second dependent variable, I use the average forward citations that the patents obtain in 
subsequent seven-year windows after the filing year, and this variable is expressed as INV_Q.  
                                                          
15 The paper acknowledges access to the Mannheim Innovation Panel and patent databases from the Centre for 
European Economic Research (ZEW). 
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4.3.3 Explanatory variables 
An explanatory variable used in the econometric analysis is EXT_R&D, which is a binary 
variable and indicates whether a firm outsources R&D activities to specialized research 
organizations. In addition to the standard yes or no answers to identify the use of this R&D 
strategy, I consider the ratio of expenditures on R&D outsourcing over the firm’s sales as an 
indicator of R&D outsourcing intensity (EXT_R&D_INTENSITY). The expenditures on R&D 
outsourcing are scaled by the firm’s sales to avoid the firm size effect on R&D spending (Grimpe 
and Kaiser, 2010). 
 
Table XVI– Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable names Variable definition Obs. Mean Std dev. Min. Max. 
INV_N Patent counts in the periods 1998–2000 and 2002–
2004, respectively to the 1997 and 2001 surveys  
1568 1.067 5.852 0 84 
INV_Q The average forward citations that the firm’s 
patents obtain in subsequent seven-years windows 
after the filing year 
1568 0.103 0.497 0 10 
EXT_R&D Binary: 1 if a firm outsources R&D activities  1568 0.312 0.463 0 1 
EXT_R&D_INTENSITY The expenditures for R&D outsourcing divided by 
the firm’s sales 
1568 0.001 0.003 0 0.075 
INT_R&D Binary: 1 if a firm invests in internal R&D 1568 0.4536 0.498 0 1 
INT_R&D_INTENSITY The expenditures for internal R&D divided by the 
firm’s sales 
1568 0.005 0.019 0 0.2291 
R&D_COOP Binary: 1 if a firm has R&D cooperation with an 
external actor 
1568 0.192 0.394 0 1 
R&D_INTENSITY The expenditures for entire R&D divided by the 
firm’s sales 
1568 0.016 0.038 0 0.5580 
EXPORT_INTENSITY The share of sales from exports 1568 0.174 0.226 0 0.9333 
LOCATION_EAST Binary: 1 if a firm is located in East Germany  1568 0.328 0.469 0 1 
PRE_INV_N Pre-sample patents in the period 1989–1993 1568 1.187 10.836 0 264 
PRE_INV_Q Average forward patent citations obtained for the 
pre-sample patents in the seven years after the 
filing year  
1568 0.174 0.731 0 8 
LOG_SIZE Firm employees in logarithmic values  1568 5.398 1.559 1.609 12.213 
MEDIUM-LOW-TECH 
INDUSTRY 
Industry dummy: 1 if a firm belongs to the 
medium-low-tech industry  
1568 0.324 0.468 0 1 
MEDIUM-HIGH-TECH 
INDUSTRY  
Industry dummy: 1 if a firm belongs to the 
medium-high-tech industry 
1568 0.288 0.453 0 1 
HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY Industry dummy: 1 if a firm belongs to the high-
tech industry 





4.3.4 Control variables 
I consider several control variables that might be relevant in the econometric model for invention 
performance. First, I control whether a firm conducts R&D activities internally. For this purpose, 
I use a binary variable to identify whether a firm invests in R&D undertaken inside its laboratory 
establishment (INT_R&D), and I also control the internal R&D intensity calculated as the 
expenditures on internal R&D divided by the firm’s sales (INT_R&D_INTENSITY). A number 
of previous studies consider internal R&D as a key source for leveraging firm learning processes 
and developing firm-specific competencies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). Internal R&D is 
also considered to be a requirement for the effective utilization of knowledge acquired from 
external actors (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). Based on these 
arguments, there should be a positive relationship between internal R&D and invention 
performance. Second, I account for whether a firm has formal R&D cooperation with an external 
actor; the variable has a binary outcome and it is expressed as R&D_COOP. Cooperation in 
R&D is seen as an important instrument to acquire skills and specialized know-how from 
external entities, to minimize the costs and risks of R&D projects and, as a result, to improve the 
performance of R&D activities (Hagedoorn, 1993; Powell et al., 1996). 
 
Moreover, I include the size of the entire R&D activities of the firm measured as the ratio of 
expenditures on the entire R&D over the firm’s sales (R&D_INTENSITY). In line with prior 
research (Bound et al., 1984; Pakes and Griliches, 1984; Jensen, 1987; Cardinal and Hatfield, 
2000; Ahuja and Katila, 2001), I expect a positive relationship between the size of R&D 
spending and the invention performance.  
 
In addition, I introduce the variable export intensity (EXPORT_INTENSITY), which is 
calculated as the share of sales from exports, to control for the international competition that 
firms face (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). In the econometric 
analysis, I also control for firm location, specifically whether it is in East or West Germany 
(LOCATION_EAST). Given that there are regional differences between East and West Germany 
with regard to the infrastructure and economic growth, firms located in East Germany might be 




Furthermore, I account for firms’ prior accumulated knowledge in the econometric analysis. It 
can be expected that those firms that accumulated a high stock of knowledge in time t-1 are more 
likely to be innovative in period t. In other words, there can be pass dependency in invention 
activities (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Cyert and March, 1992). Therefore, I introduce the 
PRE_INV_N and PRE_INV_Q variables into the regression models to control for pass 
dependency in the invention performance. PRE_INV_N refers to the pre-sample patent counts in 
the five-year period. Given that the sample includes the 1997 and 2001 surveys and each survey 
contains information about the innovation activities of the firms during the past three years (for 
instance, the 1997 survey provides information about the firms’ innovation activities in the 
period 1994–1996), PRE_INV_N represents patent counts in the period 1989–1993. To account 
for the quality of these pre-sample patents, I take the average number of forward citations per 
patent in seven-year windows after a patent was filed (PRE_INV_Q). In the econometric models, 
the variables PRE_INV_N and PRE_INV_Q are introduced in logarithmic values. Given that 
some firms do not have any patent or forward patent citations, the logarithmic transformation of 
these variables results in missing values. To deal with this issue, I set the value to zero for the 
missing values (LOG (PRE_INV_N) = 0 if PRE_INV_N = 0) and introduce an additional 
dummy variable (zero for patent values and one for non-patent values; the same applies to 
average forward patent citations) (Beneito, 2006; Grimp and Kaiser, 2010).  
 
Table XVII– Industry breakdown   





Food and beverages, tobacco  
Textiles, leather, footwear  














Rubber and plastic products  
Machinery and equipment 






Coke, refined petroleum, chemical industry 
Electrical apparatus, computing machines, communication equipment, 




Industries are classified according to the OECD (2003) manual. Manufacturing sectors related to natural resources such as mining and 




Moreover, to account for firm unobserved characteristics (Cohen, 1995) and inter-industry 
differences in terms of investing in invention activities (Malerba, 2005), firm size and industry 
dummy variables are introduced into the econometric models. Firm size is measured as the 
number of employees transformed into logarithmic values (LOG_SIZE). With regard to the 
industry dummy variable, four industry groups are introduced (based on the OECD industry 
classification): low-technology manufacturing industries, medium-low-technology 
manufacturing industries, medium-high-technology manufacturing industries and high-
technology manufacturing industries (see Table XVII). The low-technology manufacturing 
industry is taken as a benchmark variable.     
 
 
4.4 Econometric methods 
As the first dependent variable (INV_N) used in the empirical analysis has non-negative count 
outcomes (denoted by y, y ={0,1,2,….}), I use count data methods to analyse the sample. The 
starting point of count data analysis is a Poisson model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, 2009), 
which gives me the possibility to estimate a dependent variable with non-negative integers. The 
Poisson model is considered to be an appropriate econometric method for count data when the 
variance and the mean of the dependent variable have equal values (referred to as an equal-
dispersion property), which is often violated in an applied work due to the over-dispersion 
problem (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The standard method to cope with the over-dispersion 
problem is to use a negative binomial model, which preserves the mean and increases the 
variance.  
 
Another problem may also arise in count data analysis, such as a high number of zeros in the 
dependent variable. In my case, zeros may arise from different data-generation processes when a 
firm does not invest in R&D/invention activities and when a firm invests in R&D but achieves 
no invention results. These two responses have quite different meanings, because firms with no 
invention activities can only have a zero count. To cope with this issue, I use a hurdle method, 
which is a two-part model. In the first part, a logit regression is used to estimate the zero-versus-
positive outcome (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). In the second part, the Poisson or negative 




Table XVIII – Correlation table   
 
 Variable names 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 INV_N 1.000                
2 INV_Q 0.308*** 1.000               
3 EXT_R&D 0.174*** 0.171*** 1.000              
4 EXT_R&D_INTENSITY 0.052** 0.054** 0.301*** 1.000             
5 INT_R&D 0.119*** 0.168*** 0.359*** 0.153*** 1.000            
6 INT_R&D_INTENSITY 0.098** 0.082*** 0.137*** 0.252*** 0.341*** 1.000           
7 R&D_COOP 0.198*** 0.121*** 0.351*** 0.181*** 0.411*** 0.166*** 1.000          
8 R&D_INTENSITY 0.051** 0.049** 0.126*** 0.299*** 0.293*** 0.639*** 0.189*** 1.000         
9 EXPORT_INTENSITY 0.177*** 0.136*** 0.198*** 0.072*** 0.261*** 0.119*** 0.208*** 0.075*** 1.000        
10 LOCATION_EAST -0.102*** -0.099*** -0.089*** 0.029 -0.041 0.039 -0.003 0.104*** -0.242*** 1.000       
11 PRE_INV_N 0.179*** 0.159*** 0.109*** 0.002 0.101*** 0.145*** 0.083*** 0.121*** 0.074*** -0.068*** 1.000      
12 PRE_INV_Q 0.266*** 0.210*** 0.111*** -0.006 0.121*** 0.049** 0.075*** 0.042* 0.239*** -0.127*** 0.251*** 1.000     
13 LOG_SIZE 0.281*** 0.207*** 0.276*** 0.063** 0.326*** 0.023 0.291*** 0.022 0.401*** -0.241*** 0.213*** 0.261*** 1.000    
14 MEDIUM-LOW-TECH 
INDUSTRY 
-0.063** -0.065*** -0.077*** -0.052** -0.094*** -0.111*** -0.081*** -0.064** -0.123*** 0.061** -0.038 -0.021 -0.062** 1.000   
15 MEDIUM-HIGH-TECH 
INDUSTRY 
0.074*** 0.081*** 0.114*** 0.045* 0.159*** 0.084*** 0.103*** 0.069*** 0.204*** -0.108*** 0.018 0.083*** 0.101*** -0.441*** 1.000  
16 HIGH-TECH 
INDUSTRY 
0.091*** 0.092*** 0.118*** 0.103*** 0.137*** 0.182*** 0.118*** 0.114*** 0.063** -0.007 0.086*** 0.012 0.013 -0.309*** -0.284 1.000 
 





The second variable (INV_Q) used in the analysis is the ratio of forward patent citations to 
patent counts. Given that the dependent variable contains decimal numbers, the count data 
models are inappropriate in this case. To account for the specific feature of the data, a 
generalized linear model (GLM) is used in the econometric analysis (Nelder and Wedderburn, 
1972). The GLM is flexible and has the power to model the data with ratio and non-normal 
distributions when a proper family distribution and link function are defined in the model. I use 
the GLM with a gamma family distribution and a log link, because the variance exceeds the 
mean in the dependent variable. I also introduce a robust option into the model to obtain robust 
standard errors if the family distribution is incorrectly specified. Furthermore, I control time 
dummies in the GLM as well as in the count models to account for the time effect and structural 
changes over time in the analysis. 
 
4.5 Estimation results 
Table XIX presents the results from the hurdle models. As expected, R&D outsourcing 
(EXT_R&D) is significantly and positively associated with invention quantity (INV_N). In 
particular, the results from the hurdle models show that EXT_R&D is significant and positive in 
the first part as well as in the second part of the estimations (see Table XIX, models 1 and 2), 
implying that those firms that outsource some parts of their R&D activities to external entities 
are more innovative than their counterparts that do not invest in this R&D strategy. Given that 
the R&D outsourcing strategy allows firms to focus on the activities that they can perform best 
and to use the services of independent research organizations for tasks in which they lack 
expertise, this strategy can help firms to improve their invention activities. However, a non-
significant relationship is identified between large-scale R&D outsourcing 
(EXT_R&D_INTENSITY) and invention quantity (INV_N) (see Table XX). Furthermore, Table 
XXI indicates that neither EXT_R&D nor EXT_R&D_INTENSITY is significantly associated 
with invention quality (INV_Q). To sum up the findings from the empirical analysis, the results 
partially confirm the first hypothesis in which I suggest that a positive relationship exists 
between R&D outsourcing and invention performance. With regard to the second hypothesis, a 
non-significant relationship is identified between intensity of R&D outsourcing and research 
output (including invention quantity as well as quality). The data do not permit me to examine 
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further the driving factors for this non-significant relationship. To understand clearly the 
invention performance of R&D outsourcing, it might be necessary to study the returns of this 
strategy more specifically in relation to whether R&D is sourced from suppliers, consulting 
companies or research institutions.      
 
Table XIX –Innovative performance of R&D outsourcing (in terms of invention quantity) 
 
 INV_N INV_N 
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Having discussed the relationship between R&D outsourcing and invention performance, I shift 
my attention to the control variables used in the econometric analysis. Table XIX shows the 
positive relationship between INT_R&D and INV_N, implying that those firms that carry out 
R&D internally (INT_R&D) are more likely to generate a high number of inventions than their  
Table XX–Innovative performance of R&D outsourcing intensity (in terms of invention 
quantity) 
 
 INV_N INV_N 
Hurdle Negative Binomial Model 
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counterparts that do not invest in in-house R&D. Generally speaking, internal R&D is considered 
to be a key source for enhancing the learning process within a firm and developing firm-specific 
resources and integrative competencies. However, internal R&D (INT_R&D) is slightly 
significant for invention quality (see Table XXI). This might be partly due to the fact that the 
expenditures for internal R&D are not differentiated among basic, applied or developing 
activities. The same applies to the variable internal R&D intensity (INT_R&D_INTENSITY), 
which is slightly significant for invention quantity but not significant for invention quality (see 
Tables XX and XXI). In the econometric models, I also introduce interaction terms between 
outsourced and internal R&D (i.e. INT_R&D_BINARY*EXT_R&D_BINARY and 
INT_R&D_INTENSITY*EXT_R&D_INTENSITY), but both interaction variables are 
significant neither for invention quantity nor for invention quality. Previous research on German 
manufacturing firms also provides no evidence of a complementary relationship between 
external (outsourced) and internal R&D (Schmiedeberg, 2008).    
 
Additionally, the empirical analysis shows that R&D cooperation (R&D_COOP) is slightly 
significant and positive in the first part of the hurdle model but non-significant in the second part 
(see Tables XIX and XX). Moreover, Table XXI provides a non-significant relationship between 
R&D cooperation and invention quality. This could be explained by the fact that for invention 
quantity as well as for invention quality, not only cooperating with external actors in R&D, but 
also with whom this cooperation takes places, whether it is research institutions, suppliers, 
customers, etc. may be important. For invention performance, it may also matter whether the 
purpose of R&D cooperation is knowledge exchange or joint innovation development 
(Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2012). 
 
Turning to the other control variables, R&D intensity16 (R&D_INTENSITY) is significantly and 
positively associated with invention quantity (see Table XIX), but the significance level of the 
coefficient is lower for invention quality (see Table XXI). In contrast, export intensity 
(EXPORT_INTENSITY) and firm size (LOG_SIZE) are significantly and positively related only 
                                                          
16 The R&D intensity variable (R&D_INTENSITY) is excluded from the econometric analysis presented in Tables 
XX and XXI (models 3 and 4) due to the high correlation between R&D_INTENSITY and 
INT_R&D_INTENSITY (see Table XVIII). 
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to invention quantity (see Tables XIX and XX); both of the variables are non-significant in the 
econometric analysis for invention quality (see Table XXI). In a somewhat similar way, past 
innovation activities matter only for invention quantity and not for invention quality. This might 
be due to the  fact  that  the  number of forward citations, which is  used  as an indicator of patent  
Table XXI – Innovative performance of R&D outsourcing (in terms of invention quality) 
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Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are in 




quality, depends on whether a firm’s patent attributes technological knowledge of citing firms 
and their absorptive capacity (Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2012). With regard to the variable 
LOCATION_EAST, it is significantly and negatively associated with invention quantity, which 
is line with other studies displaying that West German firms are more innovative than their 
counterparts located in East Germany. However, Table XXI shows that there is no significant 
difference between firms located in West Germany and firms located in East Germany in terms 





The question of whether firms experience ‘gains’ or ‘pains’ from R&D outsourcing is a subject 
of ongoing research in the R&D management literature. A number of previous papers discuss 
this issue, yet little is known about how this strategy relates to the value of an outsourcer firm’s 
research output. Motivated by this research gap in the literature, this study further discusses the 
prior research findings and provides new insights into the relationship between R&D outsourcing 
and invention performance (in terms of patent quantity as well as quality). In particular, this 
paper finds that those firms that outsource R&D functions to specialized research organizations 
generate more inventions than their counterparts that do not invest in this R&D strategy. Given 
that R&D outsourcing allows firms to contract out some R&D activities in which they do not 
possess high-class expertise and to concentrate on the activities that they can perform best, such 
inter-firm task division may help companies to devote their financial and human resources to 
their key research activities and, as a result, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their 
invention performance. However, this positive performance implication of R&D outsourcing 
does not appear to hold for invention quality. Moreover, the empirical analysis indicates that 
large-scale R&D outsourcing is associated significantly neither with invention quantity nor with 
invention quality.  
 
Due to the data limitation, I could not explore what drives the ambiguous relationship between 
R&D outsourcing and invention quality as well as between the intensity of this strategy and 
invention performance (including invention quantity and quality). The dataset is also a two-year 
cross-sectional set, which does not allow a causal interpretation here. Moreover, to understand 
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the performance implication of R&D outsourcing clearly, it might be required to take into 




5 Summary and conclusion 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine whether firms gain or lose from open innovation 
adaption. The recent progress of information and communication technologies has greatly 
induced firms to increase their degree of openness in innovation. In particular, as modern 
information and communication technologies allow firms to share knowledge instantly and 
inexpensively with high-quality scientists and engineers around the world, the value of the 
internal-R&D-oriented approach has eroded. Instead, firms have adopted the open innovation 
framework for the purpose of developing innovation jointly with external actors or acquiring 
ready R&D results from them. This, on the one hand, can help firms to develop innovations 
relatively quickly and inexpensively and to respond swiftly to new market threats and 
opportunities (Chesbrough, 2003; Keupp and Gassmann, 2009). However, on the other hand, the 
open and distributed innovation approach can also be a risky business in the context of hollowing 
out companies’ internal innovation capabilities and, consequently, hampering their innovation 
performance. Motivated by these contradictory arguments, the thesis aims to examine the risks 
and benefits of the open innovation approach.  
Before studying the performance implication of this approach, Chapter 2 explores how firms set 
boundaries in open innovation. Prior research on open innovation provides no systematic insight 
into whether firms with internal innovation constraints increase the scale of R&D outsourcing or 
the number of innovation cooperation partnerships. Hence, the chapter addresses this research 
gap in the literature and examines whether it is a cost- or resource-oriented logic that encourages 
firms to adopt different open innovation strategies. Analysing a three-year panel dataset of 
German manufacturing firms obtained from the Mannheim Innovation Panel database, we find 
that knowledge-related obstacles induce firms to increase their scale of R&D outsourcing as well 
as to engage in innovation cooperation with a wide set of external actors. In contrast, a non-
significant relationship is detected between economic-related innovation impediments and R&D 
openness. In particular, the study shows that cost- and risk-minimization objectives do not play a 
significant role either in increasing the scale of R&D outsourcing or in engaging in innovation 
cooperation partnerships. Hence, the research shows that the primary purpose behind increasing 
the degree of openness with regard to R&D outsourcing and innovation cooperation is to access 
external skills and expertise. From the perspective of R&D outsourcing, it is surprising that the 
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main purpose of large-scale R&D outsourcing is to deal with knowledge-related innovation 
impediments. The R&D outsourcing strategy may help firms to acquire valuable knowledge that 
is unavailable internally, but accessing external knowledge through an arm’s length contractual 
relationship may not be an effective strategy to utilize the tacit component of technological 
knowledge. Furthermore, this strategy may displace the outsourcer firm’s internal innovation 
activities and, in this way, hamper its innovation performance. 
Chapter 3 takes up this issue and examines whether external R&D complements or substitutes 
other innovation strategies (i.e. internal R&D and innovation cooperation). Although previous 
studies discuss this issue (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Lokshin et al., 2008; Schmiedeberg, 
2008; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010), the geographical dimension of external R&D has thus far not 
been studied. In other words, firms that acquire international, rather than domestic, external 
R&D may have a greater tendency to invest in internal R&D as well as to engage in innovation 
cooperation partnerships, because the utilization of external knowledge stemming from 
international R&D suppliers may require an advanced level of internal capability. Hence, 
Chapter 3 studies whether domestic and international external R&D complement or substitute 
internal R&D and innovation cooperation. Moreover, the performance implication of domestic 
and international external R&D is examined in this chapter. To study these issues, we analyse 
Danish manufacturing firms on the cross-sectional level using data obtained from the 
Community Innovation Survey. The survey contains information on the expenses for R&D 
performed by external actors, whether domestic or international, and then subsequently used in 
internal innovation activities. To confirm the complementary relationship between innovation 
strategies, we use the adoption and performance approaches. The adoption approach shows that 
international external R&D complements internal R&D and innovation cooperation, but the 
performance approach indicates that joint representation of these instruments has a significant 
negative sign for product innovation, implying that firms face difficulties in successfully 
combining international external R&D and internal R&D as well as international external R&D 
and innovation cooperation. Somewhat to the contrary, no significant complementary or 
substitutive relationship is found between domestic external R&D and internal R&D or between 
domestic external R&D and innovation cooperation.  
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More importantly, the research reveals that those companies sourcing R&D inputs from 
international rather than domestic external actors are more likely to introduce product 
innovations with a higher degree of novelty. In contrast, domestic external R&D is related 
significantly and positively to product imitation, but it has a significant and negative sign for the 
novelty of product innovation.  
Chapter 4 further discusses the performance implication of R&D outsourcing and provides new 
insights into the relationship between this strategy and invention performance. Although Chapter 
3 contributes significantly to our understanding of the performance implication of external R&D, 
measuring the R&D output by product innovation may not reflect the overall quality of an 
outsourcer firm’s research processes. For example, a product innovation might be a result of 
combining externally available knowledge inputs, and it may not be a good indicator of the 
quality of internal invention activities. In other words, the knowledge and production boundaries 
of a firm may vary. Hence, Chapter 4 examines how R&D outsourcing is associated with the 
value of a firm’s research output (in terms of invention quantity as well as quality). To study this 
issue, the Mannheim Innovation Panel dataset is combined with patent data obtained from the 
European Patent Office. The former gives detailed information about the innovation activities of 
German firms, whereas the latter provides data about the patents applied for by the firms at the 
European Patent Office.  
The results obtained from the data analysis suggest that those firms that outsource some R&D 
functions are more likely to generate inventions than their counterparts that do not invest in this 
strategy. However, a non-significant relationship is identified between R&D outsourcing and 
invention quality. Furthermore, large-scale R&D outsourcing is associated significantly neither 
with invention quantity nor with invention quality. 
From a managerial perspective, the above-presented findings have a number of implications. In 
particular, the thesis suggests that open innovation in general and R&D outsourcing in particular 
have a value-enhancing objective rather than a cost-minimization purpose. In other words, the 
growth objective (in terms of acquiring external knowledge) is the main factor that stimulates 
companies to outsource R&D activities, whereas the defensive objective (in terms of minimizing 
the costs and risks of R&D projects) does not play a significant role. Hence, companies should 
undertake more strategic consideration when outsourcing their R&D activities and they should 
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seek to grow through employing this strategy. Nowadays, the question is not whether to acquire 
R&D inputs from external entities, but rather where to search for appropriate R&D suppliers and 
how to transfer knowledge effectively from them. Indeed, the study shows that there are 
significant differences in domestic external R&D and international external R&D. More 
specifically, the research reveals that sourcing R&D inputs from a domestic R&D provider can 
be a risky strategy when a firm aims to generate breakthrough product innovations. Instead, the 
firm should seek to acquire knowledge inputs from international marketplaces. As knowledge-
based assets sourced from international marketplaces might be more heterogeneous than those 
within the home country due to the different institutions and national innovation systems, firms 
that acquire international, rather than domestic, external R&D are more likely to introduce 
product innovations with a higher degree of novelty. In other words, companies that source R&D 
inputs from international marketplaces can have more opportunities for knowledge 
recombination and perform better in innovation than others that rely purely on domestic 
resources. Therefore, firms need to establish international linkages to access valuable resources 
that are unavailable within their home markets and to improve their innovation performance. 
Policymakers should also encourage and reward firms to collaborate with international agencies 
and to grow through acquiring international external R&D. More specifically, governments 
should ease the restrictions on outsourcing R&D activities abroad and help companies to identify 
suitable R&D suppliers. This would be especially helpful for small and medium-sized firms 
wishing to collaborate with international R&D providers and to tap into the global knowledge 
pool.  
Furthermore, outsourcing R&D activities abroad can stimulate other types of innovation 
activities, such as internal R&D and innovation cooperation. As the research suggests, firms that 
opt for international external R&D simultaneously invest in internal R&D and engage in 
innovation cooperation partnerships. This is due to the fact that knowledge transfer from 
international, rather than from domestic, R&D suppliers might be more problematic because of 
the different national innovation systems, cultures and institutions across countries. For this 
reason, firms that acquire international external R&D simultaneously engage in other innovation 
activities (i.e. internal R&D and innovation cooperation) to enlarge their absorptive capacity and 
to utilize knowledge from international entities effectively. However, the research also indicates 
that firms face problems in achieving a positive performance outcome through combining these 
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innovation strategies. This might be due to the fact that a high degree of openness in innovation 
may cause not only the absorptive capacity problem but also the attention allocation problem. In 
particular, when there are many ideas for a firm to choose between, only a few of them will be 
given the required level of attention and effort to be implemented (Koput, 1997; Katila and 
Ahuja, 2002). Therefore, firms need to balance their internal R&D activities and their degree of 
openness to avoid the over-searching problem and to gain from the open innovation framework.  
The research also shows that those firms that outsource R&D activities are more likely to 
generate inventions than their counterparts that do not invest in this R&D strategy. As the inter-
firm division of R&D labour allows firms to concentrate on their key research activitiesand to 
acquire rather peripheral R&D functions from a specialized research organization, R&D 
outsourcing can help firms to improve the effectiveness of their research activities. However, this 
positive performance implication of R&D outsourcing does not appear to hold for invention 
quality. Due to the data limitation, I could not examine the drivers of the ambiguous relationship 
between R&D outsourcing and invention quality.  
The thesis also suffers from other limitations that offer interesting avenues for future research. 
First, to understand the performance implication of R&D outsourcing in more detail, future 
research should examine the differences in R&D inputs sourced from suppliers, competitors, 
universities, consulting companies and other external actors. This differentiation could be 
important for a clear understanding about the performance implication of R&D outsourcing. 
Second, the thesis shows that firms engage in various open innovation strategies simultaneously, 
but they fail to combine these instruments successfully for product innovation. This might be due 
to the over-searching problem that reduces the returns from the open innovation framework, but 
future research should investigate the factors that prevent companies from capturing values from 
pursing different innovation strategies simultaneously. In particular, research should examine the 
challenges that R&D outsourcing brings to internal R&D activities. In this context, it could be 
interesting to study whether R&D outsourcing complements or substitutes internal basic and 
applied research activities and how it changes an outsourcing firm’s skill composition. Third, 
further study is required of the geographical patterns of openness to understand the differences in 
the performance implication of R&D inputs sourced from various European countries, the USA, 
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